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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IRAQ CONFLICT AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR 
TURKEY (2003-2007) 
 
Türken, Anıl 
 
M.I.R, Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Sean McMeekin 
 
October 2007 
 
 
This thesis evaluates the security threats posed to Turkey after the March 
2003 invasion of Iraq. The newly emerging federal, democratic Iraqi state and its 
political, economic and ethnic make up is analyzed in detail in order to demonstrate 
the threats it may pose to Turkish national security. The thesis looks at the links 
between the terrorist organization the PKK and the Kurdish Regional Government 
in Iraq, as well as outlining mistakes of Turkish foreign policy in the region that 
have led to the current impasse. The Turkmen minority in Iraq, the status of Kirkuk 
and other disputed territories, as well as Iraqi and Kurdish legislation on Iraq’s 
energy resources are also analyzed. This thesis aims to draw a roadmap for Turkish 
foreign policy in the region that would avoid past mistakes and address security 
concerns for the future, while guaranteeing Iraq’s territorial integrity.  
 
Keywords: Iraq, Kirkuk, PKK, Turkmen, Oil, KDP, PUK, ITF 
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ÖZET 
IRAK SAVAŞI VE TÜRKİYE’NİN GÜVENLİĞİNE ETKİLERİ (2003-2007) 
Türken, Anıl 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Sean McMeekin 
Ekim 2007 
 
Bu tez Mart 2003 sonrası Irak’taki gelişmeler ve bu gelişmelerin 
Türkiye’nin güvenliğine oluşturduğu tehditleri değerlendirmiştir. Mart 2003 sonrası 
federal, demokratik Irak devletinin politik, ekonomik ve etnik yapısını detaylı bir 
şekilde analiz edip, Türkiye’nin güvenlik sorunlarına olan etkilerini incelemiştir. 
Terör örgütü PKK ve bu örgütün Kürt Bölgesel Yönetimi ile olan bağlarını analiz 
edip, Türk dış politikasının geçmişteki hatalarını ve bu hataların bugünkü çıkmaza 
gelinmiş olunmasındaki katkılarını ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca bu tez Irak’taki 
Türkmen varlığını, Kerkük ve benzeri tartışılan bölgelerin geleceğini ve Irak’ın 
enerji kaynaklarının paylaşımı ile ilgili yasa tasarılarını detaylı bir şekilde 
inceleyerek, gelecekte Türk dış politikası için bir yol haritası çizmeye çalışmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Irak, Kerkük, PKK, Türkmen, Petrol, KDP, KYB, ITC 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the security situation in post-March 
2003 Iraq and its effects on Turkish national security. By giving the reader an in 
depth analysis of the different ethnic and religious groups that have emerged as 
power brokers in the new federal, democratic Iraq, this thesis aims to provide a 
roadmap for future Turkish foreign policy alternatives in the region. As this thesis 
will demonstrate, Turkish foreign policy in the region has been plagued by poor 
decisions, and one dimensional thinking which has deeply damaged its national 
security interests. While there have been many academic studies conducted on 
Turkish-Iraqi relations, very few have focused on the emerging political landscape 
after the toppling of the Saddam regime.  
 This thesis can be divided into five major parts which are all interrelated 
and necessary for the reader to get the complete picture on the realities on the 
ground. The first part of the thesis will focus on the Kurdish terrorist organization, 
the PKK. Responsible for over 30,000 deaths, the PKK has long been a major 
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 roadblock in Turkish-Iraqi relations. The sensitivities of the Turkish state on this 
issue has and will continue to shape its foreign policy initiatives in the region. By 
demonstrating the historic links of the PKK to the geography of northern Iraq, and 
it relations with Kurdish politicians and tribesmen in the region, the reader will get 
the necessary background information on the tense relations between Turkey and 
the Kurdish Regional Government.  
 In the second part of the thesis, the role of the United States in post-March 
2003 Iraq will be looked at. This section aims to give the reader an understanding 
of the complicated nature of Iraqi politics that have emerged after the Saddam 
regime. We will look at the strategies and policies of the United States in Iraq, from 
the time period leading up to the invasion of Iraq until the ‘The New Way Forward 
Plan’ of 2007. The long and painful process leading up to the first democratic 
elections in Iraq, and the Iraqi permanent constitution will also be analyzed.  
In the third section we will see how Turkey has responded to the 
developments in Iraq, and underline the policy mistakes which resulted in the 
current political mess. But most importantly, this section will outline 
recommendations on how Turkey must engage Iraq more actively in the political 
arena. Throughout the history of Turkish foreign policy in Iraq, Ankara has 
followed a one dimensional policy of only establishing strong relations with the 
Turkmen while ignoring other political actors among the Arab Shiite and Arab 
Sunni communities. Through the analysis of the major players in Iraqi politics, this 
thesis will show that there are other actors in Iraq which share some of the security 
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 concerns that Turkey does on a number of important issues, such as the territorial 
integrity of Iraq.  
 In the fourth section of the thesis we will shift our attention to Northern 
Iraq. We will look at the makeup of the Kurdish Regional Government and the 
territories which fall under its domain. Our analysis will include the Turkmen 
minority in the region, their historical origins, political aspirations and links to 
Turkey. By gaining this understanding we will then have the necessary background 
information to look at the status of Kirkuk, and other disputed areas in the region. 
Why is Kirkuk so important? What are the current constitutional decrees on these 
territories? How much oil is there in the region? What will be the status of the 
proposed referendum in Kirkuk? All these questions will be addressed. 
 In the fifth and final section, the thesis will analyze the proposed draft 
‘Federal Iraqi Oil Law’ and the ‘Kurdistan Petroleum Law’. By taking an in-depth 
look at both of these documents, we will get a clear picture as to how the oil 
revenues will be distributed in Iraq. This will answer such questions as: Are 
Turkish concerns on Kurdish domination of energy resources in the north of Iraq 
valid? Who benefits the most from the draft ‘Oil Law’? What are the major 
disagreements? What is the relationship between the ‘Kurdistan Petroleum Law’ 
and the federal oil law? Which one takes precedence over the other?  
 This thesis will follow an empirical methodology. By each section building 
on the other, the reader will be given all the necessary information on the political, 
economic and security situation on the ground in Iraq. This paper is unique in that 
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 it provides the reader with three perspectives on the Iraq conflict: the Turkish 
perspective, the American perspective and the Iraqi perspective. The Iraqi 
perspective is far from being a homogenous one, therefore it is further divided into 
the Kurdish, the Shiite Arab, the Sunni Arab, and the Turkmen perspectives. Once 
looking at the issue from the viewpoint of all the players in the region, the thesis 
will be able to lay out a roadmap of foreign policy for Turkey which actively 
engages the different political players in the region in order to suit its national 
interests.  
 The sources that were used in the thesis include official Turkish, Kurdish, 
Iraqi and American government sources, as well as reports of major think tanks and 
their analysis of the developments. Memoirs of experienced politicians that served 
in the region, interviews with key political players as well as archive research of 
major news and media organizations are also included. Special attention was given 
to keeping the sources as diverse as possible so as to give the reader the viewpoint 
of all sides involved.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE PKK 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Ever since the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States by 
al-Qaeda, the term ‘Global War on Terror’ has been coined to try to forge an 
international alliance on the fight against terrorism. Turkey, as a country that has 
long suffered from terrorism plays an active role in the global war on terror. 
However as this chapter on the PKK will illustrate, Turkey’s own security concerns 
not only lacks the support of the international community, but its terror problem is 
supported by both regional and western states. In order to understand the Turkish 
security concerns regarding the developments in Iraq after March 2003, it is 
essential that we analyze the origins and goals of a terrorist organization that is 
responsible for over 30,000 deaths in less than three decades.  
One of the main reasons for the sensitivity of the Turkish state towards the 
developments in Northern Iraq is the Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK. Other 
names or aliases the PKK has used or is known by are as follows; Partiya Karkeren 
5 
 Kurdistan, Kongra-Gel, Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti (HSK), Kurdistan Freedom 
and Democracy Congress, Kurdistan People’s Democracy Congress, Kurdistan 
People’s Congress (KHK), People’s Congress of Kurdistan, The People’s Defense 
Force.1  The PKK was founded in 1974 by Abdullah Öcalan, a Kurdish student at 
Ankara University’s Political Science Department. The Kurdistan Workers Party 
has a multi dimensional political as well as military strategy aimed at the creation 
of an independent Kurdistan carved from the southeastern territories of the Turkish 
Republic.  
Our analysis of the PKK will consist of three parts. First we will look at the 
ideology of the organization, and how it has evolved over the years. This will be 
followed by a look at what the Turkish State has done to battle this terrorist 
organization, both politically and militarily. We will than look at the foreign 
support the organization receives, its links to Turkey’s neighboring states and the 
cost of their decades of violence, in terms of lives lost and the economic impacts.  
The PKK should not be looked at as an isolated entity. Instead we will see 
that it is an organization with links to governments and intelligence services all 
over the world. Therefore this analysis of the PKK will demonstrate two important 
points. The first point is that the PKK enjoys its success when there is a lack of 
authority prevalent in the region. When the terrorist organization first emerged, the 
Turkish security forces were not prepared to engage an enemy of this nature. With 
the use of unconventional hit and run guerilla tactics, the PKK aimed to erode the 
                     
1 U.S. Department Of  State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, (2005), “Country 
Reports on Terrorism 2005”, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf ,pg.206   
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 authority of the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey, and show the local 
population that the only authority in the region was the PKK. In the 1990’s the 
reforms in the mentality and organization of the Turkish security forces, the 
investments in the modernization of the military combined with heavy troop 
deployments to the region, began to put the PKK on the defensive. However, 
regional developments in Turkey’s neighboring geography and the lack of authority 
in the border regions led to the PKK using Turkey’s neighbors as a base for their 
operations. This will bring us to the second and more important point in our 
analysis of the PKK. We will see that successful military engagement of the PKK 
was not enough to solve the problem. The amount of foreign support going to the 
terrorist organization and the safe havens it enjoyed in states like Syria, and the one 
it is continuing to take advantage of in Northern Iraq have made it extremely 
difficult to isolate and engage the PKK within the borders of Turkey itself. 
Therefore the caution and alarm felt by Turkish authorities at the presence of the 
PKK in Northern Iraq will be understood as we analyze the links of the 
organization to circles outside of Turkey, and how it uses this to continue its status 
as the bloodiest terrorist organization in the world.  
 
2.2 Formation, Development and Ideology of the PKK 
 According to Prof. Dr. Ümit Özdağ, one of the leading experts on the issue 
of PKK terrorism and the organizations links to foreign state sponsors, the PKK’s 
emergence goes back all the way to 1973. He states that the PKK spent the years 
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 from 1973 to 1980 cementing its ideological development and the training of its 
leading cadre. Taking Mao Ze Dong’s ‘Guerilla Warfare’ tactics as its modus 
operandi, Öcalan and his followers aimed to erode the authority of the Turkish 
Armed Forces in the southeast, and force the local population, through fear and 
intimidation, into accepting the PKK as the only authority figure. Prof. Özdağ 
states that this so-called ‘People’s War’ by the PKK would begin in 1984 through 
the Eruh and Şemdinli attacks on Gendarmerie outposts of the Turkish Armed 
Forces, thus beginning its long and relentless brutality in the region.2  
The PKK has always taken advantage of the lack of authority in Turkey’s 
neighboring geography, especially in northern Iraq, in order to set up huge camps 
of operations for their hit and run tactics across the border. This was the case 
during ‘Operation Provide Comfort’, which began on July 24th, 1991 and ended on 
31st of December, 1996.3 This was a humanitarian aid operation that was aimed at 
providing assistance to Kurdish refugees fleeing from Saddam Hussein. Protecting 
the Kurdish refugees from the onslaught of the Iraqi troops also resulted in a power 
vacuum in Northern Iraq. This vacuum was taken full advantage of by the PKK, 
which solidified its presence in the region. Similar circumstances were present all 
throughout ‘Operation Northern Watch’, which was aimed at enforcing the no-fly 
zone north of the 36th parallel.4 It began on January 1st, 1997 and lasted until May 
                     
2 Özdağ, Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonları:1984 – 2007 (PKK Operations of the Turkish Army: 
1984 – 2007), (Istanbul: Pegasus, 2007), pg.11 & pg. 12  
3 James E. Kapsis, “From Desert Storm to Metal Storm: How Iraq has Spoiled US – Turkish 
Relations” Current History, Vol. 104, No.685, (Nov. 2005), pg. 382 
4 James E. Kapsis, “From Desert Storm to Metal Storm: How Iraq has Spoiled US – Turkish 
Relations” Current History, Vol. 104, No.685, (Nov. 2005), pg. 382 
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 1st, 2003. It prevented the Iraqi Air Force and helicopter gun ships from targeting 
Kurds. What it did at the same time was leave the PKK free to roam around the 
area as it saw fit. Both of the above mentioned operations were conducted by the 
United States and United Kingdom, as well as France which took part in the former 
but not the latter. The operations were conducted with the full permission and 
cooperation of the Turkish government.    
 Before we go on any further it is important to point out that the status of the 
PKK as a terrorist organization has been confirmed by France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States, all having added 
the organization to their lists of terrorist organizations. The PKK has been listed in 
the annual report of the US Department of State ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’ for 
more than a decade. PKK has been recognized as a terrorist organization by NATO 
and it has also been on the ‘European Union Terrorist Organizations and Entities 
List’ since April 2nd, 2004.5 Despite this, the PKK has devoted special attention to 
using Western Europe in particular as a base of financial activity aimed at 
generating revenue to fund the organizations activities through all sorts of illegal 
activities which we will look at in detail later on.  
Abdullah Öcalan during an interview with Turkish Journalist Hasan Cemal 
said the following striking words, “I put politics on the mind of the shepherd in 
Hakkari.” 6  
                     
5 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Building up of International Solidarity, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Terrorism/Buildingupofinternationalsolidari
ty.htm; (accessed August 6th, 2007)  
6 Cemal, Kürtler (Kurds), (Istanbul:Doğan Press, 2003), pg.41  
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  This above mentioned quote taken in 1993, gives us a glimpse into Öcalan’s 
mind. The main goal of the PKK was not just reigniting Kurdish nationalism within 
Turkey, but also gradually assuming a role of being the leader of all Kurds, whether 
they be in Iran, Syria, Iraq or Turkey. This ideology inevitably put the PKK on a 
collision course with Messud Barzani, head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and 
Jalal Talabani, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. We will look in detail 
at the complicated relationship between the three parties later on, but let us keep in 
mind that in a region as complicated as Northern Iraq, there was never a clear cut 
alliance or hostility between these groups, these perceptions changed as the 
conditions changed, with only one certainty, they all competed for the same 
position with the same goal, lead the wave of emerging Kurdish nationalism.  
 
2.3 Chronology of Kurdish Rebellions 
Kurdish nationalism did not emerge with the PKK: It had been existent 
decades before. The PKK just reignited old flames. Although it is not the aim of 
this paper to go into in detail the historical causes of Kurdish nationalism, it is 
crucial to realize that the movement long preceded the PKK, and will continue long 
after the PKK is gone. Let us briefly look at some of the major rebellions aimed at 
the Turkish state which were sparked by Kurdish nationalism.7
 The first of these was the Ali Batı rebellion in May of 1919. The attempts to 
                     
 
7 For a more detailed account into the history of Kurdish nationalist movements in Turkey, please 
consult, Uğurlu, Nurer. 2006. Kürt Milliyetçiliği – Kürtler ve Şeyh Sait İsyanı (Kurdish Nationalism-
Kurds and the Sheikh Sait Rebellion), Istanbul: Örgün Press.  
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 create an autonomous Kurdish region in southeastern Turkey were unsuccessful 
and it was defeated by military means. The second rebellion was the Cemil Çato 
rebellion of May 1920. This was a joint effort between Armenians and Kurds to 
establish an Armenian state in eastern Turkey. It was defeated through military 
means. The third rebellion was the Milli tribal rebellion of June, 1920. Through 
French support, the uprising of the Kurds to establish an autonomous Kurdistan 
within Turkey was the goal. But due to lack of support from other Kurdish tribes in 
the region the rebellion was put down by military means. This was followed by the 
Koçgiri rebellion of March 1921. Angry at the rejection of the Sèvres Agreement 
by the Turks, the Kurds involved in the rebellion tried to set up an independent 
Kurdistan in the southeast of Turkey. It was put down by military means in 1921. 
After the creation of the Turkish Republic another major rebellion by the name of 
Sheikh Sait took place in February of 1925. With religious ideology as its base, it 
was a Kurdish Muslim rebellion aimed at destroying the secular Turkish regime 
and bringing back the caliphate and Islamic rule. Only through large scale military 
intervention was the rebellion finally brought under control and defeated by June of 
the same year.8
The latest rebellion of Kurds against the Turkish state is regarded as the 
formation of the terrorist organization PKK. But before we go back to our analysis 
of the terrorist organization we will take a brief look at the Sèvres Agreement. 
                     
 
8 The source for the dates and description of the Ali Batı, Cemil Çato, Milli, Koçgiri and Sheikh Sait  
Kurdish rebellions is, Uğurlu, Kürt Milliyetçiliği: Kürtler ve Şeyh Sait İsyanı(Kurdish Nationalism: 
Kurds and the Sheikh Sait Rebellion), (Istanbul: Örgün Press, 2006), pgs. 64, 65 & 72 
11 
 Signed by the Ottoman government on August 10th, 1920, it was designed to carve 
out independent Armenian and Kurdish states from the territory of southeastern 
Turkey. As we saw in our previous look at the Kurdish rebellions, the rejection of 
the Sèvres agreement by Mustafa Kemal and his followers was a development that 
resulted in further Kurdish rebellions.  
 
2.4 Sèvres Agreement 
Let us look for a moment at what the Sèvres Agreement entailed. The 62nd, 
63rd, and 64th Articles stated: 
East of the Euphrates River, an Armenian border to be determined in 
accordance with the 27th Article, sections two and three. Those areas of 
majority Kurdish population north of Syria and Iraq and within Turkey, will 
be autonomous.9
 
In the 63rd Article: 
The Ottoman government declares from now that it will accept any decision 
and act upon it within three months, that is made by the committee to be. 
One year after this agreement goes into effect, the Kurds mentioned in 
Article 62, if those in regions where they make up the majority, can prove 
that they wish to be independent from Turkey, can apply to the League of 
Nations, provided that they met the necessary requirements, Turkey 
declares that it will accept all the decisions made and relinquishes all its 
claims and rights on the region. If this relinquishing of rights and claims by 
Turkey takes place, when it takes place, the parts of Kurdistan that have 
remained in the Mosul province until now with Kurds residing in it, can if 
they will it, join the independent Kurdish state.10
 
This agreement not only carved out an Armenian state within Turkish 
                     
 
9 Uğurlu, Kürt Milliyetçiliği: Kürtler ve Şeyh Sait İsyanı(Kurdish Nationalism: Kurds and the 
Sheikh Sait Rebellion), (Istanbul: Örgün Press, 2006), pg.61 
10 Uğurlu, Kürt Milliyetçiliği: Kürtler ve Şeyh Sait İsyanı(Kurdish Nationalism: Kurds and the 
Sheikh Sait Rebellion), (Istanbul: Örgün Press, 2006), pg.62 
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 borders, but it also paved the way for the creation of an independent Kurdistan 
within Turkey. The Turkish nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal, rejected the 
agreement and based their movement in Ankara, thus paving the way for a War of 
Independence. To this day any talk of autonomy or independence for Kurds in 
northern Iraq is a very sensitive subject in Turkey. Some see a future independence 
for Kurds in northern Iraq as a return of the Sèvres Agreement being imposed on 
Turkey once again. Others say this is mere ‘Sèvres Paranoia’ created by Turkish 
nationalists in order to bring to a halt the reforms necessary in gaining entry into 
the European Union.  
 In a letter to President Jimmy Carter in February of 1977, Mustafa Barzani 
had this to say about the Sèvres Agreement: 
The 1920 Sèvres Agreement in equivalence with other nations that made up 
the Ottoman Empire, gave Kurds the right to determine their own destiny. 
But international interests prevented Kurds from realizing this goal. 11
 
 Such views that have been voiced freely and without any reservations by 
the leaders of the Kurdish movement throughout the decades that followed the 
Lausanne Treaty, caused rightful suspicions and fears among Turks about the true 
intentions of the Kurds that were asking for autonomy and independence in 
northern Iraq.    
Now that we have taken a brief look at the major acts of rebellion instigated 
                     
 
11 Öznur, Cahşların Savaşı – Kuzey Irak Kürt Hareketi ve Musul-  
   Kerkük Meselesi (War of the Cahş - Northern Iraq Kurdish Movement and Mosul, Kirkuk        
  Problems), (Ankara: Altınküre Press, 2003), pg.242  
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 by Kurdish nationalism, let us get back to the latest rebellion begun by the PKK in 
1984. It shares certain characteristics with the previous rebellions in that foreign 
support is abundant, and it aims for the creation of an independent Kurdistan. It 
also requires the support of the local population to succeed. But the PKK differs in 
that, instead of conventional warfare with the state, it relies on unconventional 
guerilla tactics, aimed at canceling out the military superiority of the Turkish 
Armed Forces. 
 
2.5 Turkish Military and Unconventional Warfare  
 The PKK initially avoided direct contact with the security forces. There 
were two reasons for this. The first was it was not yet ready militarily to engage the 
armed forces, potential defeats could have damaged the prestige of the organization 
in the eyes of the local population for which so much depended on if the PKK 
wanted to succeed. And the second reason was that the PKK first needed to 
eliminate rival revolutionary groups active in the region which also aimed to 
establish their own authority. Such groups were leftist in ideology and relied on 
Marxist principles much like Öcalan and his followers did. These groups that were 
forcibly put out of the equation by the PKK were; ‘People’s Revolutionary Union’, 
‘People’s Freedom’, ‘Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Union’ and other smaller 
groups active in the region.12 This strategy was successful in that it established their 
authority and grasp on the region very early on, and gave a warning to all those that 
                     
12 Özdağ, Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonları:1984 – 2007 (PKK Operations of the Turkish Army: 
1984 – 2007), (Istanbul: Pegasus, 2007), pg. 33 
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 stood in their way that they meant serious business. The Turkish security forces 
were caught by surprise at the success the PKK enjoyed in the late 1980’s. The 
PKK had successfully planted its militants in major cities all throughout the 
southeast of Turkey, and was actively waging a war of propaganda by eroding the 
trust of the local population on the government’s security forces. Successive 
ambushes on military targets and the targeting of civilians in rural villages had 
caused the local population to fear the organization. The state was caught 
unprepared to fight an unconventional war with an enemy that farmed his land, or 
tended his livestock by day and picked up his AK-47 by night.  
The period from 13th of December 1983 to 9th of November 1989 
corresponded with the Özal government’s period in power in Turkey. Turgut Özal, 
Prime Minister at the time, initially never took the PKK threat seriously. He looked 
at the PKK as a bunch of anarchist youth, and did not realize the potential of the 
threat.13 As a result many of the precautions that needed to be taken, such as re-
training the security personnel to deal with a mobile, unconventional threat, 
fortifying security outposts in rural areas, cutting foreign funding to the terrorist 
organization and shifting the security responsibilities of the region from the 
Gendarmerie to better trained Special Forces, were all neglected. Below is what 
General Necati Özgen, who was in charge of the period between 1991 to 1993 as 
the head of Regional Gendarmerie Security in South Eastern Turkey, had to say in 
an interview with Turkish journalist Hasan Cemal:  
 
                     
13 Cemal, Kürtler (Kurds), (Istanbul:Doğan Press, 2003), pg.72 
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 Summer of 1991, when I took over as head of Gendarmerie, the region was 
a fire zone, there was no state! We were not ready. The Gendarmerie 
stations held up to 20, sometimes 10 troops. But those stations were all built 
to engage smugglers. Only later were the outposts fortified, the district 
Commando units, tanks, helicopters, night vision equipment, snow vehicles 
were all brought in. Special Forces training were given to specialized units. 
These developments began to speed up especially in 1992. 14
  
As Özgen’s experience shows, the Turkish Armed Forces were unprepared 
during the 1980’s. That decade was enough time to give PKK a psychological 
advantage in that it was able to terrify the local population into submission. Here is 
what one villager in the south east had to say regarding the PKK; “You are at the 
foot of the mountain. The man comes (PKK). Yes, you are loyal to your country 
and people, but the man will kill everyone in the village if you don’t comply. What 
can you do but comply?”15
The period starting from the formation of PKK until the year 1992, in which 
the Turkish Armed Forces began to put the PKK on the defensive, the terrorist 
organization conducted three so-called Congresses. The first of these was on 
November 27th, 1978 in Diyarbakır.16 This was the Congress which declared 
Abdullah Öcalan as the head of the PKK. It was used as a meeting to cement his 
authority among his followers. The 2nd Congress was to be held from August 20th to 
25th, 1982 in the Bekaa valley under Syrian control.17 This Congress was important 
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 in two respects. The first of these was that it was made possible due to the 
sponsorship of Syrian intelligence, which had introduced Öcalan to members of the 
‘Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ (PFLP).18 The PFLP would be 
crucial in both training PKK militants in guerilla tactics and explosives as well as 
providing training camps in the Bekaa valley for PKK use. These were the same 
camps which had trained ‘Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia’ 
(ASALA) militants previously, a hotbed of terrorist activity right under the eyes of 
the Syrian government. The second reason this particular congress was important is 
because the PKK decided to move into Northern Iraq. Northern Iraq meant 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) territory, but this was not a problem since 
Messud Barzani did not refuse when Syrians approached him for permission. Some 
militants crossed directly through to northern Iraq. Those that couldn’t because of 
Iraqi security controls, were transported through Iran with the help of the Iranian 
intelligence.19 The triangle of Syrian, Iranian and KDP/PUK assistance allowed the 
PKK to maneuver freely across the region.   
 The third Congress of the PKK was held from October 25th to 30th, 1986 in 
the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.20 This Congress signaled a move by Öcalan to start 
targeting loyalist villages and soft targets such as teachers, doctors, and other 
public servants in the hopes of eroding any hopes that villagers in the region may 
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 have had of resuming a normal life. A system was set up in 1985 by the Turkish 
government which created temporary village guards to assist the security forces in 
protecting rural areas. The extremely rugged and mountainous terrain of 
southeastern Turkey made it almost impossible for the security forces to protect the 
thousands of villages located in remote areas, thus making them vulnerable to PKK 
ambushes. To alleviate this threat, a law was passed which allowed village 
volunteers to be assigned a salary and arms for protection by the state so that they 
could protect their own villages from the terrorist threat. This system irritated the 
PKK, as certain government-loyal villages began to cause the PKK considerable 
casualties. Öcalan wanted to make an example out of these loyalists so that in the 
future all villagers would think twice before taking up arms against the PKK. The 
decision taken in the third Congress served this goal. As a result the PKK began 
attacking villages suspected of aiding the security forces, killing all inhabitants of 
the villages in the process.   
 
2.6 PKK – Financing of Activities 
There is no shortage of financial resources for the PKK as it has links to 
many intelligence networks around the world. Öcalan, in his own words admits 
during an interview in April of 1993: 
You take a movement from zero, and bring it to where it is today. But we 
are still not taken seriously, Can this be? The West takes us seriously, offers 
for meetings are flying in from everywhere, yet Ankara pretends like we 
don’t exist. In the West, government and state doors are open to aid the 
PKK. At first even the West was not like this with us. However they saw 
that the PKK gained real strength. They decided to change their policies 
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 towards us. The Prime Minister of Finland met with me. Belgium is still 
meeting with me. United Kingdom parliament is also holding talks with the 
PKK. Our representatives go to the United States. The same is true with 
Iran. There are talks being held in all Caucasian countries. Armenia, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan are all areas in which we are active. Support for the 
Kurdish people is at its peak. Compared to before we are both militarily and 
politically stronger. Turkey’s public opinion is supporting us. But still we 
are ignored in Ankara. 21
 
 Even if we take all of the above mentioned as purely a terrorist’s 
propaganda, this does not mean the PKK secures its financial needs only through 
legal means. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the main 
sources of PKK funds are generated through extortion of Turkish and Kurdish 
businessmen both within Turkey and abroad, drug trafficking into Europe through 
Turkey, arms smuggling, smuggling of refugees to Western countries, sales of 
publications, and organizing of special fund raising concerts and nights.22 The US 
Department of State, in its ‘Country Reports on Terrorism – 2005’, states that the 
PKK has received safe haven and aid from Syria, Iraq and Iran. The report also 
mentions that two media outlets were located in Belgium that served as the 
mouthpiece of PKK: BRD Corporation Media Production Company and ROJ NV.23 
The ROJ NV also moved its operations to Denmark later on, and was the cause of a 
crisis between the governments of Denmark and Turkey. However this channel 
continues to air its terrorist propaganda under the protection of the Danish 
government.  
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 The Newspaper ‘Özgür Politika’ which is PKK-owned, continued to be sold 
freely in Germany until September 5th, 2004 when it was banned.24 However, an 
appeal made to German judiciary by the PKK sympathizers resulted in the ban 
being lifted soon after. The newspaper continues to be sold today in Germany, with 
revenues going directly to financing of PKK terrorist activity.  
 ‘EUROPOL’, which is a European Police Force aimed at fostering the 
cooperation of European Union member countries to battle terrorism, drug 
trafficking and other illegal activities taking place within the Union, has also been 
active in tracking PKK activities. EUROPOL states that the PKK takes part in 
kidnappings, smuggling of illegal immigrants into the EU, trafficking of drugs and 
running prostitution rings in order to raise funds.25
 With such a network operating worldwide, from the Middle East, to the 
European Union to Canada and beyond, the PKK is quite successful in obtaining 
the financial backing it needs to continue its operations. This is not an issue the 
Turkish government can tackle alone; it needs the cooperation of all states involved 
within the framework of the ‘Global War on Terrorism’.  
 
2.7 PKK in the 1990’s 
 Beginning with the new strategy adopted by the Turkish Armed Forces in 
1992, the PKK began to find itself losing ground on all fronts. Successive cross 
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 border operations by the Turkish military in the 90’s would further erode its power 
base and camps in northern Iraq. 
Let us look at some statistical figures given by General Yaşar Büyükanıt, 
Chief of Turkey’s General Staff, during his Turkish General Staff Press Briefing on 
12th of April, 2007. General Büyükanıt stated: 
In the year 1992: 496 soldiers died in action, 955 wounded due to the battle 
with PKK terrorism, in 1993: 538 soldiers died in action, 996 wounded, in 
1994: 867 died in action, 206 wounded, in 1995: 615 died in action, 342 
wounded. Today you cannot generate solutions by keeping the PKK 
separate from Northern Iraq, and Northern Iraq separate from the rest 
of Iraq. They are all organically related. The first turning point in the war 
against the PKK was the first Gulf War. During this war Turkey gave full 
support to the Coalition forces. But in the end Turkey ended up suffering as 
a result. At the end of the war hundreds of thousands of refugees piled up at 
Turkey’s borders. 26
 
The second turning point according to General Büyükanıt was the no-fly 
zone north of the 36th parallel: 
The no fly zone also established a protected area for PKK forces to operate 
in. This situation still continues. The list of casualties I stated previously, all 
correspond to this time frame, this was the turning point. Unfortunately the 
third stage has also been as a result of another Gulf War. Turkey has once 
again been hurt by the war for two reasons. The first being, it has been 
locked into its geography. The second being, PKK has gained immense 
freedom and huge amounts of weapons and ammunitions have fallen into its 
hands from the remains of the former Iraqi army. You might ask this: 
‘Should a military operation be conducted in northern Iraq?’ Yes it should. 
This has two dimensions. The first, when looked at through the eyes of the 
military, yes it should be conducted. Will it have benefits? Yes it will.27
 
The messages given in this speech were loud and clear. First and foremost it 
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 was a green light to the ‘Justice and Development Party’ (AKP), and Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, to take the necessary steps so that the Turkish Armed Forces 
could enter northern Iraq. The second message was that northern Iraq under its 
current conditions will continue to be a base for PKK terrorists. The power vacuum 
left by the Kurdish Regional Government’s tolerance and support of the PKK was 
the reason for the recent escalation in PKK attacks on security forces. As 
mentioned before in the paper, the PKK has always prospered when Turkey’s 
neighboring regions have been unstable. General Büyükanıt draws the same 
conclusions as he states that during the first Gulf War, due to the refugee crisis and 
the no fly zone safe haven, the PKK had been able to deliver such blows to the 
security forces. Today a similar climate exists in northern Iraq, and a military 
operation is necessary to disrupt the comfort and safety under which the PKK 
operates. The important question here is, what had the Turkish Armed Forces 
achieved in the 1990’s with cross border operations? Where they effective in 
battling the PKK? How many were conducted and under what legal basis? Let us 
now answer these important questions, which will also shed some light on whether 
or not such an operation in the future will be as effective as General Büyükanıt 
claims it would.  
 
2.8 Hot Pursuit 
The legal basis for the 24 cross border operations the Turkish Armed Forces 
conducted from 1983 to 1999 was the February 1983 treaty between Turkey and 
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 Iraq on ‘Border Security and Cooperation’.28 This treaty gave both sides the 
permission to engage in hot pursuit of terrorists. The term ‘Hot Pursuit’ was 
actually based on a 1982 United Nations Maritime Law which allowed states to 
pursue those which have violated its laws into international borders if need be.29 
Through a bilateral agreement, both Iraq and Turkey agreed to extend this law to 
encompass land forces. It is important to point out that in 1988, Iraq requested 
permission from Turkey so that its troops could cross into Turkish soil in pursuit of 
Kurdish refugees; however Turkey refused permission on the grounds that the 
refugees did not present a national security threat to Iraq.30 As a result, Iraq 
cancelled the ‘Border and Security Cooperation Treaty’ in 1988. The subsequent 
operations Turkey conducted in northern Iraq drew the protests of the Iraqi 
government and coincided with a time period when the Saddam Hussein regime 
was supporting the PKK terrorists.  
According to Serhat Erkmen, an expert on the Middle East desk of ‘Eurasia 
Strategic Research Center’ (ASAM), throughout the period from 1991 until 1998 
Turkey was the most active force within northern Iraq. He states that the factors 
that contributed to this effective role in the region included the need for Turkish 
support by the different groups in northern Iraq (KDP & PUK), the issuing of 
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 Turkish diplomatic passports to Barzani and Talabani, economic aid given to these 
groups by Turkey, multi-national NGO’s entering the region through Turkey, black 
market petroleum flow into Turkey from Northern Iraq, the entrance of basic goods 
from Turkey into Iraq, the Turkish military and Special Forces presence in the 
region, and cross border operations.31 The decade of 1990 also saw the two 
prominent Kurdish parties in the region, the KDP and PUK, collapse into armed 
conflict. Turkey took advantage of this division and acted both as a broker of peace, 
as well as using the differences between the KDP and PUK to its own advantage. 
As a part of the peace force that was deployed to the region, Turkey was able to 
place its intelligence personnel as well as Special Forces in the major cities in 
northern Iraq. Intelligence was the number one priority, both in keeping PKK 
activity in the region under surveillance as well as monitoring KDP and PUK 
movements.  Iran was also actively involved in the conflict, providing support to 
the PUK, while Turkey opted to shift towards the KDP, sometimes coordinating 
joint attacks on the PKK with Barzani’s peshmerga (Kurdish Militia).  
 
2.9 Cross Border Operations of the Turkish Military 
Instead of chronologically going through each of the 24 cross border 
operations the Turkish Armed Forces engaged in, let us look at the major 
operations that took place and the effects it had on the PKK.   
The Operation of 25th May, 1983 was the first military incursion into 
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 northern Iraq by the Turkish Armed Forces.32 At the time the PKK had settled into 
the camps owned and operated by the KDP. These camps were located very close 
to the Turkish border. Main aim of PKK was to engage in hit and run tactics on 
Turkish security outposts in a region the PKK referred to as ‘Botan’.33 It included 
the provinces of Siirt, Van and Hakkari, the strongholds of PKK militant activity.34 
The operation targeted KDP camps. Included 7,000 troops that crossed 5km. into 
the Iraqi border. 35 The success of the operation can be measured by the words of 
Şemdin Sakık, the PKK’s top militant at the time. The Turkish Armed Forces 
captured Şemdin Sakık in a secret raid in northern Iraq on April 13th, 1998. 
Charged and convicted for the deaths of more than 200 people, about half of them 
civilians, including the killing of 33 unarmed Turkish soldiers, who were dragged 
off a bus and executed.36 Sakık recalled, “I was at the KDP controlled ‘Haftanin’ 
Camp on 22nd May, 1983 (Time period of the Turkish Military Operation). We felt 
defeated, destroyed. On 15th of June, 1983, I crossed back into Şırnak.”37   
Shortly after the operation, the KDP and PKK signed a protocol of 
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 cooperation, ‘PKK, KDP Cooperation Principles’ in July of 1983. The protocol was 
signed in Damascus, and the main points it entailed are as follows: 
1. To be against imperialism of all sorts, especially American, 
2. To fight the fascist regimes of Turkey and Iraq which are the 
enemies of the people in the region, 
3. Instead of quarreling among ourselves, among ideological lines, 
and aiding our enemy, we should act together in our struggle, and 
to settle any disputes through talks and not the use of arms, 
4. Not to intervene in each others domestic affairs, 
5. Aim of victory for the Kurdish nation.38 
                
The alliance between the KDP and PKK would last until the year 1987, 
when the KDP decided, both due to disagreements with Öcalan and to its mounting 
losses as a result of Turkish military activity and political pressure, that it was time 
to cancel the protocol of alliance.39 The complicated nature of the hostile relations 
between Barzani and Talabani played a big role as well. Soon after KDP broke off 
with PKK, the PUK stepped in and would sign a similar protocol of alliance with 
the terrorist organization.  
As mentioned before, in a region like northern Iraq, there are no long term 
alliances or hostilities. All agreements and disagreements are temporary and subject 
to change according to developments. If one wants to gain a healthy understanding 
of the relations between the Kurdish groups in the region, one must keep in mind 
that it is not just a chess game that all sides are playing, it is more like a multi 
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 dimensional chess game that is all intertwined and going on simultaneously. To 
decipher this enigma let alone formulate successful strategies to deal with it, is an 
extremely difficult undertaking. As Turkish policy makers have figured out through 
painful experience, winning the military aspect of the conflict does not ensure 
success in the region. The politicians need to make wiser decisions based on first 
hand information on the ground. This can only be done through access to first hand 
and reliable intelligence. As Serhat Erkmen had pointed out in his analysis of 
Turkish foreign policy in the region, access to such intelligence had been at the 
disposal of Turkish policy makers in the 1990’s. Therefore, the trend we see in the 
Turkish Military incursions into northern Iraq tends to portray a series of well 
coordinated and focused pinpoint Special Forces and Commando raids into PKK 
camps. This strategy worked in a way in that it eliminated PKK shelters and 
ammunition storage facilities which made survival in winter conditions extremely 
difficult. Night vision equipment, attack helicopters that could operate at night, and 
other similar gear was obtained as a result of the increased spending the Armed 
Forces took in the 1990’s for modernization purposes, all paid dividends in the 
fight against the PKK.   
According to Professor Özdağ, a large amount of spending on the 
modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces had only begun in the 1990’s because 
the Özal government had largely held back extra funds needed for the Armed 
Forces. The ability to conduct night time operations with the assistance of attack 
helicopters was obtained in 1990 through the purchase of AH-1 W Super Cobra 
27 
 Attack Helicopters. By 1994, the military had at their disposal 27 AH-1 Cobra and 
10 AH-1 Super Cobra Attack Helicopters.40 This meant that the PKK, once located, 
could be targeted immediately with deadly force.  
The real progress in the war against the PKK came during the Demirel and 
Çiller governments. During the Demirel era, the military was given the funds 
necessary to modernize its equipment. However it was during Tansu Çiller’s term 
as Prime Minister that the whole resources of the Turkish state were mobilized 
against the PKK.  
There were three major military incursions into northern Iraq during the 
Demirel and Çiller governments. The first of these was the Hakur Operation of 
October of 1992 during the Demirel Government. Attempts of the PKK to create 
‘salvaged’ areas free of the presence of Turkish Armed Forces were dealt a severe 
blow with this operation.41 Under the Çiller government the Zeli Operation of 
January of 1994 took place. It was an Air Force supported operation, with heavy 
bombing and troop incursion into northern Iraq.42 The second major incursion into 
northern Iraq under the Çiller government was ‘Operation Steel’ of March of 1995. 
It was the biggest military operation conducted by the Turkish military outside of 
its borders to that date. Around 35,000 troops with air support entered into northern 
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 Iraq.43 The main target was the city of Zakho close to the Turkish border. It was 
believed at the time that due to the high degree of casualties that the PKK suffered 
as a result, and the degree of the destruction of their camps, that they would cease 
to be a major threat to Turkish security forces any longer. Below is what then-
Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller had to say about the operation in March of 1995: 
This is not a 10 day operation! We will stay until we are a 100% satisfied 
that we have met our objectives. We did not limit our operation in time or 
in scope. This will be a decisive blow to the PKK. We needed to clean 
Northern Iraq to fully control the regions on our side. Due to the lack of 
authority present there, and disputes between Barzani and Talabani, PKK 
was able to gain strength in Northern Iraq.” 44  
 
As stated before, Çiller not only gave the green light for the most 
comprehensive cross border military operation in the history of Turkey, but she 
also mobilized all the resources of the Turkish state in the war against the PKK. 
This was done with the assistance of the Turkish Police Forces. Head of Turkish 
Police at the time (July, 1993) was Mehmet Ağar, a man that would later enter 
politics and rise to the top in the same party that Tansu Çiller headed, ‘True Path 
Party’ (DYP). Deeply trusted by then-Prime Minister Çiller, Mr. Ağar was given 
the task of creating a ‘Special Operations Unit’ within the Turkish Police. Mehmet 
Ağar immediately called on Korkut Eken, a former member of the National 
Intelligence Agency (MIT) and member of the ‘Special Warfare Unit’ within the 
Turkish Armed Forces, to pick and train the personnel that would make up this 
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 specialized unit.45 The Special Operations Units made their way to the trouble spots 
in the southeast and were very effective in combating PKK militants.  
If one year could be picked out that would be deemed as the most successful 
year in combating the PKK, it would be 1995. By the end of that year, the rank and 
file members of the organization were scattered around northern Iraq, and hiding 
out until the PKK could re-group. In the sixth Congress of the organization, held 
through May 1st, 1996 to May 15th, 1996, Öcalan decided to adopt the strategy of 
suicide attacks.46 This was interpreted by many analysts as a last ditch attempt by 
the PKK to prove its status as a major threat to Turkish national security. Although 
several suicide attacks were carried out by the PKK after the decision of the sixth 
Congress, it did not live up to the expectations of Öcalan who had envisioned a 
level of violence parallel to those that Palestinian suicide bombers had caused in 
Israel.  
 
2.10 Foreign Aid to the PKK 
 The PKK had been on the verge of collapse by the end of 1995, and it was 
in dire need of support. The distress signal sent by Öcalan produced immediate 
results in the form of a combination of Greek, Armenian, Syrian, Iranian, Iraqi, and 
Kurdish support to the organization.   
 The period from 1996 up until February 16th, 1999, when Abdullah Öcalan 
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 was caught in Kenya by Turkish authorities, was marked by fascinating yet 
shocking evidence of a number of states being caught red handed in supporting a 
terrorist organization. Before we go any further, it is important to keep in mind that 
the problem of PKK terrorism was used as a trump card by Turkey’s neighboring 
states. And under such circumstances, no matter how successful or comprehensive 
the Turkish Armed Force’s incursions into northern Iraq were, the results would 
only be short term.  
 Steven A. Cook, an expert on U.S. Middle East policy as well as Turkish 
politics, was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman of the ‘Council on Foreign 
Relations’ (A highly respected and non-partisan think tank in the United States). 
Cook called the rising tensions between the United States and Turkey as the great 
underreported story of the 2003 war in Iraq. He stated, “On the political level 
everything that the Turks said they feared would happen, and would negatively 
affect their security, has in fact happened in Iraq. And their concerns are, as we 
started talking about, the PKK & Kurdish nationalism.”47 There are two very 
important points here. The first of these is that no matter how much Turkey tries to 
keep the issue of PKK terrorism on the global agenda, its efforts tend to be 
fruitless. The second important point being that, Turkey has always pointed to what 
its security needs are before hand, giving advanced warning to all states in the 
region as to the problems that might occur in the future if the PKK continues to 
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 base its operations in northern Iraq. However these warnings have so far fallen on 
deaf ears, and the situation has reached its boiling point.  
 Let us first look at the Syrian patronage of the PKK and the events leading 
up to the ultimatum given to Syria by General Atilla Ateş on September 16th, 1998. 
Head of the Turkish Land Forces at the time, during a visit to the Hatay province, 
in a move planned out and calculated before, General Ateş pointed to the Syrian 
border and stated: 
As the Turkish state we are trying to establish good relations with our 
neighbors. Despite our good intentions and efforts, some of our neighbors, 
and I will state the name clearly, Syria, is misjudging our good will. They 
have caused Turkey to suffer from the evil of terrorism due to their support 
of the terrorist Apo (Abdullah Öcalan). All troubles originate from Syria. 48  
 
Going hand in hand with this ultimatum, President Demirel also made it 
clear to Syria that if it did not change its policies towards the PKK, Turkey would 
take action. Troop deployments to the Syrian border were simultaneously 
conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces. The message was clear, stop supporting 
PKK, or we will declare war. Shortly afterwards, Öcalan was asked to leave 
Damascus by the Syrian authorities.  
Below is what Abdullah Öcalan had to say regarding PKK’s ties to Syria in 
April of 1993: 
As for Syria’s support for us, or what you label as support, there is no 
decrease, but an increase. But I am not making an analysis stating that Syria 
used to support us more, or is now supporting us more. Syria’s role in our 
struggle is stronger and longer in validity. 49
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Head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jalal Talabani seems to 
corroborate Öcalan’s words in an interview he gave to PUK’s weekly publication, 
Al-Wasat in February of 1999: 
Reporter: “Where did you first meet Öcalan? 
Jalal Talabani: “When I first met him, he was a young refugee, 
He lived in our party’s headquarters in Syria.”  
Reporter: “Were your relations good with Öcalan?” 
Jalal Talabani: “I saw him a couple of times in Damascus. The PKK’s 
relations with our party were going well. Öcalan was in favor of an 
immediate beginning to armed struggle. Others were reluctant. Thanks to 
us, Öcalan met Palestinian resistance fighters.” 50
 
 Jalal Talabani had similar statements during a meeting with officials of the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry at the Foreign Ministry in Ankara on the 26th of June, 
1992:  
PKK is at the moment using Iran and Armenia as a base. On the other hand 
I doubt that Syria has distanced itself from this organization. Syrians are 
playing this role of distancing themselves from the PKK as a part of their 
game plan. However it is hard to believe the PKK has exited this country.51
 
The above admissions of Abdullah Öcalan and Jalal Talabani of the role of 
Syria in relation to PKK help explain why the Turkish Armed Forces and 
government felt the need to make such an ultimatum to Syria. What followed was 
more like a world tour for Öcalan, after he was forced out of Syria on October 9th, 
1998. He was sent to Moscow, where he stayed a little over a month. After Turkish 
Intelligence contacted Russian authorities and informed them about their 
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 knowledge of Öcalan’s whereabouts, the Russians, despite denying the allegations, 
forced Öcalan out the backdoor. In November of 1998, Öcalan arrived in Rome and 
stayed there until January of 1999.52 The next stop on Öcalan’s world tour was 
Athens. Greeks decided that keeping Öcalan in Athens was too much of a risk and 
sent him to their embassy in Kenya. Through the help of the CIA with its large 
Nairobi office, Öcalan was finally caught by Turkish authorities on February 14th, 
1999, after he exited the Greek embassy in Nairobi.53  
The capture of Öcalan while under the protection of the Greek Foreign 
Ministry was broadcast worldwide and was the cause of a big political scandal in 
Greece. According to Neophytos G. Loizides, an academic expert on Greco-
Turkish relations, politicians in Greece often used the unresolved problems with 
Turkey as a trump card during domestic political campaigns, hoping to gain quick 
spikes in the polls.54 The issue of PKK terrorism was another trump card which 
both the Greek government and its intelligence services were using against Turkey. 
The prime minister in Greece during the Öcalan crisis of February 1999 was Kostas 
Simitis of the ‘PASOK’ party. He was heavily criticized by the opposition in 
Greece for making a mess of the Öcalan issue, and damaging Greece’s image in 
international relations. Below is what Öcalan had to say about Greece’s actions and 
the reasons for Greek support to the PKK during an interview with Turkish 
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 journalist Tuncay Özkan: 
What is important is the role of Greece. This has to be seen clearly. What 
Greece did is horrendous. It was done on purpose. They are not honest. 
Greece through me being eliminated wanted to spark a Turkish – Kurdish 
war in Turkey. Pangalos (Theodoros Pangalos, Foreign Minister of Greece 
during the Öcalan crisis, was forced to resign after the scandal) insisting 
incredibly that I be thrown out of the Greek Embassy in Kenya was a 
horrible incident and plan. Me going to Greece initially was due to his 
invitation. They wanted to use us, but when I failed to cooperate in their 
plot, they then wanted to eliminate me.55
 
The words of Öcalan speak a great deal as to just how complicated and 
multifaceted the international chess game on the PKK was and still is. At this 
juncture to call the PKK a Turkish problem would be a gross misjudgment. From 
the PKK bases that were in Syria, Iran, Armenia to the involvement of Greek 
officials, to the role of Russian intelligence, CIA, MOSSAD, and to northern Iraq, 
the present day home of the PKK, what we are seeing is the PKK being used as a 
tool to damage Turkey’s stability and security. We often hear of the phrase ‘The 
Global War on Terror’, however here we see an example of the reverse in effect, 
‘The Global Support of Terror.’ And unfortunately in the latter case the intelligence 
personnel of these states seem to be cooperating much more efficiently.  
This support of the PKK resulted in the deaths of more than 30,000 civilians 
and Turkish security forces, according to Press Statement released by the U.S. 
Department of State on August 14th, 2006.56   
                                                         
54 Neophytos G. Loizides, “Greek - Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession Process”, 
Security Dialogue, Volume 33, Number 4, pg. 434 
55 Özkan, Abdullah Öcalan: Neden Verildi? Nasıl Yakalandı? Ne Olacak? (Abdullah Öcalan – Why 
was he handed over? How was he caught? What will happen?), (Istanbul: Alfa Press, 2005) pgs.2 – 
4  
56 United States Department of State, McCormak, “Turkey:22nd Anniversary of PKK Violence”, 
(August 14th, 2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/70550.htm , (accessed July 2nd, 2007)  
35 
 As tragic and striking as these numbers are, it is important to point out that 
they do not take into account unreported crimes and deaths. The PKK is known to 
execute many of its own militants due to insubordination and escape attempts, and 
these figures are not included. The economic impact of the years of extraordinary 
security precautions taken in the region, the lack of investment, unemployment and 
military expenses is said to have cost the Turkish state around 100 billion US 
Dollars since the mid 1980’s.57 With that amount of money spent on the fight 
against terrorism, instead of being channeled to building more schools, hospitals, 
factories, dams, and other investments badly needed in the region, the situation has 
turned into a cycle of unemployment, rise in volunteers for joining the PKK and 
mass migration to the western cities of Turkey from the southeast.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
POST-MARCH 2003 IRAQI POLITICS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
We have had a detailed look at the PKK in our previous section, analyzed 
its ideology, methods of operation and its links to foreign state sponsors. Now let 
us shift our attention to Iraq. As General Yaşar Büyükanıt stated during his press 
statement on April 12th, 2007, it is impossible to find a solution to the problem of 
PKK terrorism without looking at Iraq and its role. This section of the thesis is 
aimed at answering some key questions regarding post-March 2003 Iraq. Was there 
sufficient planning by the Pentagon on how to control a post-war Iraq? Who are the 
key players in Iraqi politics? What is the nature of the partnership between the 
Kurds and the United States? Why hasn’t the United States taken concrete steps in 
dealing with the issue of PKK activity in Iraq? And will Iraq remain a unitary state 
or end up falling apart on sectarian grounds? All of these questions have direct 
consequences for the national security of Turkey and the rest of the region.  
According to a report published by the ‘Iraq Study Group’ in December of 
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 2006, a bipartisan group chaired by James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, the 
situation in Iraq is grim. Their findings state that the current security situation in 
Iraq is very complex. The Sunni insurgency, Shiite militias and ‘death squads’, the 
presence of al-Qaeda and widespread criminality are tearing Iraq apart, they state, 
especially in the capital of Baghdad.58 Other striking figures that the report contains 
include the number of displaced Iraqi nationals within Iraq at 1.6 million, and put 
the figure of those that have fled the county at 1.8 million.59 With a total population 
of Iraq at approximately 26 million, the above stated numbers mean 13% of the 
Iraqi population is displaced. This, coupled with the degree of violence existent on 
a daily basis, figures of which we will look at in more detail later, and the lack of 
sufficient number of U.S. troops, lack of training of the Iraqi security forces, have 
made Iraq into a living hell. Under such circumstances, the report of the ‘Iraq Study 
Group’ made a recommendation of a short term increase in the level of U.S. troops 
in Iraq, to be followed by a gradual reduction in the numbers to come into effect in 
2008. At the time the report was published, the number of U.S. troops in Iraq was 
at 141,000. There were 16,500 more troops in Iraq from 27 coalition partners which 
included the second largest contribution made by the United Kingdom, 7,200 
troops.60 Ever since the report was published, more Republican think tanks began 
to push for an increase in U.S. troop levels in Iraq. One such organization was the 
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 ‘American Enterprise Institute’, in their own words, ‘a conservative think tank 
dedicated to preserving and strengthening the foundations of freedom.’ The 
influence of AEI is deemed as far reaching in both the Pentagon and the White 
House, and their proposal quickly set the stage for an increase in troop numbers and 
a new strategy on Iraq. Frederick W. Kagan, a fellow scholar at the AEI and a 
specialist on defense issues and the American military was a major driving force 
behind the AEI’s new plan. Kagan stated:  
The Bush administration, its generals, and external proponents of the current 
strategy have been clear from the outset: the surge of forces in Iraq is, and 
always was, intended to be temporary. The key point is that the reduction of 
U.S. forces in Iraq, according to this plan, will be driven by changes in the 
circumstances on the ground. The decision rests with the commanders on 
the ground.61  
 
Here Kagan was talking about the ‘Troop Surge’ in Iraq, which President 
Bush announced in his address to the nation on January 10th, 2007.62 It was a part 
of a new plan called ‘The New Way Forward’, presented by the Bush 
administration as a new shift in the strategy in Iraq. The experts at AEI were 
pushing for such a surge as early as December 2006. According to Kagan, the 
biggest threat to the success of the United States in Iraq were politicians from the 
Democratic Party who were trying to put a timeline on the U.S. presence in Iraq. 
Kagan’s views were paralleled in the U.S. administration, as it embarked on a full 
scale campaign to tell the American people that if the United States withdrew 
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 prematurely from Iraq, the credibility of the United States in the eyes of the 
international community would be shattered, a historic opportunity would be 
missed to form a democratic Iraq, as well as handing Iraq over to al-Qaeda and 
risking future 9/11 style attacks on the United States. In a nutshell, everything was 
at stake in Iraq, and the last thing that was needed was a ‘timeline’. Let us now 
analyze the steps and actions proposed by ‘The New Way Forward’.  
 
3.2 The New Way Forward 
 During his address to the American people on January 10th, 2007, President 
George W. Bush stated, “The new Strategy in Iraq I outline tonight will change 
America’s course in Iraq, and help us succeed.”63 These words marked the 
beginning of Bush’s unveiling of ‘The New Way Forward’, meant to be a cure for 
the unparalleled level of violence in Iraq. During his address, Bush outlined the 
successes of the elections of 2005 in Iraq, and the formation of democratic 
institutions in his introduction. But the part that was highly anticipated was his 
decision to undertake an increase in the number of troops in Iraq, more specifically 
in Baghdad. Two important points he made during his speech were; a) 80% of the 
sectarian violence in Iraq occurred within 30 miles/50 kilometers of the capital and 
that there were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that 
had previously been cleared of any threats, and b) the troops that did operate had 
too many restrictions placed on them, were therefore limited in their capacity to 
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 react. And than Bush came to the most important part of his address when he 
stated, “The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades 
across Baghdad’s 9 districts. This will also require an increase in American force 
levels. So I’ve committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. 
The Vast majority of them will be deployed to Baghdad.”64 The exact figure of 
American troops included in the surge would be close to 30,000, as the total 
number of American troops in Iraq would reach a record high of 168,000 by June, 
2007.65
‘The New Way Forward’ strategy contained six basic steps: 
(1) Let the Iraqis lead 
(2) Help Iraqis protect the population 
(3) Isolate extremists 
(4) Create space for political progress 
(5) Diversify political and economic efforts  
(6) Situate strategy in a regional approach 66 
‘Let the Iraqis lead’ meant an increase in efforts to strengthen the Iraqi 
security forces, the police force and the military. In the new strategy, the goal of 
increasing the Iraqi Army from 10 divisions to 13 as well as increasing the 36 
existing Army brigades to 41 and the 112 battalions to 132 were set. Here is what 
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 Army General David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multinational Force in Iraq had 
to say in his testimony to the ‘House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs 
Committee’ on September 10th, 2007:  
Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow, develop their capabilities, and 
to shoulder more of the burden of providing security to their country. There 
are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National Police, and Special Operations 
Forces Battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the 
lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support.67 Currently, there are 
some 445,000 individuals on the payrolls of Iraq’s Interior and Defense 
Ministries.68
 
The second part of the six steps of ‘The New Way Forward’ states, ‘help 
Iraqis protect the people’. Steps that need to be taken to achieve this goal includes 
efforts at curbing the meddling of Syria and Iran into Iraqi affairs, increasing U.S. 
military presence as well as training more Iraqi security forces.69
The role of Iran in Iraq is undeniable, however one must understand the 
motives behind Iranian policy. First of all a democratic Iraq would suit Iran’s 
interests, because in a democracy the Shiites would have the power. Iraq is 97% 
Muslim in religious affiliation, around 60 to 65% of those Muslims are Shiite, 
while the remaining Muslims are Sunni, and there is around a 3% Christian 
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 population.70 What emerged during the first democratic elections in Iraq was a 
Shiite dominated government. And this trend will certainly continue in the future, 
because Iraqis tend to vote along religious lines. Therefore, the involvement we get 
from the Iranians in Iraqi politics is not one geared towards the disruption of the 
political process, as this would prevent the Shiites rising the power. It is al-Qaeda 
that engages in all sorts of activity, from devastating bomb attacks to threatening 
Sunni tribesmen and recruiting young unemployed Sunni Iraqis for future attacks in 
order to bring the democratic process to a halt.  
In the recommendations that were made by the ‘Iraq Study Group’, it called 
on Iran to ‘respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence 
over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation.’71 In this sentence is 
the key to the main U.S. concern about the role of Iran in Iraq. On the surface, what 
Iran is doing is not illegal provided that they are not caught using violence through 
their intelligence services. As long as this can’t be proven, what Iran is doing is 
simply using its weight on the ‘Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’ (SIIC) and via the 
Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini al-Sistani to bring Iraq closer to the model of the 
Islamic Revolution that had taken place in their own country in 1979. This is not to 
mean that Iran wants there to be a revolution in Iraq, there is no need for that. The 
Shiites that make up two thirds of the country can achieve this democratically. Or 
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 they might decide to secede from Iraq. Either scenario will benefit the Iranians. 
What the ‘Iraq Study Group’ recommends and the Bush administration is stuck in a 
dilemma about is, trying to befriend Iran so that this influence could be used for 
American interests. However, the ongoing fears about Iranian President 
Ahmedinejad developing nuclear weapons, and the sanctions that were imposed on 
Iran, make such a relationship impossible.  
This unease about the role of Iran did not emerge recently in the White 
House. As early April of 2003, there were warnings issued by the Bush 
administration. Below is an excerpt from Ari Fleischer’s briefing to the press at the 
White House, he was President Bush’s Press Secretary until July of that year. 
Fleischer stated:  
We have concerns about Iranian agents operating in Iraq, and we have well-
known channels of communication with Iran, we have made it clear to Iran 
that we opposed the outside interference in Iraq’s road to democracy. 
Infiltration of agents to destabilize the Shiite population would clearly fall 
into that category.72
 
The above mentioned statements, in combination with President George W. 
Bush’s insistence that there will be no talks on Iraq with Iran as long as Iran 
continues to enrich uranium, have put all sides into an impasse that looks unlikely 
to be breached in the near future. An American force that is stuck in Iraq, and has 
all its forces tied up in Iraqi territory, will surely benefit Iran. It will divert attention 
away from Iran’s uranium enrichment program.  
Another important point that needs to be made about ‘The New Way 
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 Forward’ plan is, is it as new as it claims to be? We saw from the White House 
briefing in early 2003 made by Mr. Fleischer that the Bush administration has been 
concerned with the role of Iran and other neighbors of Iraq from the beginning. 
They had made efforts then to stop Iranian and Syrian meddling, and they continue 
to do so today. The results are clear: it doesn’t work. Now ‘The New Way Forward 
Plan’ states in America’s so-called new vision and strategy for Iraq that the U.S. 
will stop the meddling of Iraq’s neighbors in Iraqi domestic affairs. And we are 
lead to believe that this time by some miracle it will work. The reality on the 
ground and past experiences suggest otherwise. The only thing new about the ‘The 
New Way Forward’ strategy is the troop surge that took place. The other segments 
of the plan seem like a sugar coating to appease American public opinion about the 
war efforts having led to no productive results. As American public opinion on the 
war is looking bleak for the administration, and the 2008 presidential elections 
approaching in the United States, the plan of the White House seems two phased. 
The Bush administration, taking the election cycle into account, has gone ahead 
with the troop surge this year. As the administration enters 2008, an election year in 
the United States, they will try to portray the image that they are cutting down on 
troop numbers, that ‘the boys are coming home’, so to speak. Even if they reduce 
the troop numbers to pre-surge levels in 2008, while nothing will have changed in 
the initial numbers of troops that were present in Iraq before the surge, Americans 
will be given an illusion that the administration is delivering on its promises. 
Whether or not the electorate will be that naive remains to be seen. 
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 We have taken a look at the ‘The New Way Forward’ plan, one that is filled 
with very vague terms and hopeful remarks as to improving the situation in Iraq. 
Even if one were to just skim the document that laid out the steps of the new 
strategy, certain phrases immediately jump out at the reader; ‘Victory in Iraq is a 
Vital U.S. interest’, ‘The fate of the Middle East hangs in the balance’, ‘Failure is 
not an option’, ‘The enemy is diffuse and complicated’, ‘Victory will take time’, 
‘No war has ever been won on a timetable’…Countless other statements of a 
similar kind are all over the document presented as ‘The New Way Forward’. 
Those with little knowledge of the realities on the ground in Iraq once reading the 
new strategy get a feeling that the administration is engaged in ‘the mother of all 
battles’ as in Saddam terminology. While it may be true that success in Iraq is of 
vital importance to the United States, let us also look at some numbers that will 
give us an idea as to the costs of this war. As this new plan in Iraq was being 
unveiled, the death toll in Iraq was at a record number.73 According to the United 
States Department of Defense figures, as of May15th, 2007, the U.S. military losses 
were at 3,390 soldiers killed since the beginning of the war in Iraq.74  
As for the number of civilian deaths in Iraq since March 2003, it has 
reached horrendous proportions. According to a website that keeps track of the 
violent civilian deaths in Iraq since the March 2003 invasion, the number of Iraqis 
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 that lost their lives is estimated at between 72,000 to 78,000.75 The ‘Iraq Body 
Count’, name of the website that delivers these statistics based on an extensive 
database of confirmed and reported attacks which resulted in civilian deaths, states 
that they have gathered their data from “cross-checked media reports, hospital, 
morgue, NGO and official figures to produce a credible record of known deaths and 
incidents.”76 These figures are only the reported and archived incidents, if we take 
into account the number of unreported incidents resulting in death we would get a 
figure closer to 100,000. 
 The death toll in Iraq is certainly at unacceptable levels. ‘The New Way 
Forward’ plan claims that it can reduce the violent trend in Iraq through the 
introduction of more troops and the training of more Iraqi security forces. But it 
seems that the newly placed importance on Iraqi security forces is a case of ‘too 
little too late’. From the beginning of post-invasion military operations of the US, 
we see a contradiction in the approach to forming the Iraqi security forces. While 
the Sunni resistance fighters were outcast and classified as a military threat to Iraqi 
security, the militias of the Shiite and Kurdish groups were allowed to continue 
their operations. This strategy backfired on the U.S. because of the religious and 
sectarian hatred prevalent in Iraq. To get a better idea of the trickiness of the 
situation, let us take a look at what Dr. Gareth Stansfield, an affiliate of the 
Chatham House think tank of the United Kingdom, had to say about the subject. He 
stated, “There is not one civil war going on in Iraq, but many civil wars and 
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 insurgencies involving a number of communities and organizations struggling for 
power. Regional powers have a greater capacity than either the U.S. or UK to 
influence events in Iraq.”77 Chatham House analysis of the situation in Iraq goes on 
to state that the violence has shifted from one that used to target coalition forces to 
a situation in which it has become sectarian, meaning Iraqis killing Iraqis. Dr. 
Stansfield has broken up the violence in Iraq into separate geographic locations 
within the country; an emerging conflict between the Kurds and non-Kurds in 
Kirkuk, a Sunni-US conflict in the center and north of the country, a Shia 
Sadrist/US & UK conflict in the center and the south, and a Sunni/Sunni conflict in 
the governorates of Anbar, Nineva and Diyala78 between tribes that have varying 
loyalties and goals.79 This is a good start at trying to convey the complicated nature 
of the violence in Iraq. Majority of public commentary on the developments in Iraq 
tend to describe the situation as a Sunni-Shiite civil war. This is an 
oversimplification. Sunni groups are not homogenous, neither are the Shiites: 
perhaps the only homogenous entity in Iraq at the moment are the Kurds. Even the 
Kurds have their differences, for example on an issue as basic as language, the 
Kurds are divided. The many different dialects of Kurdish spoken, such as the 
Kurmanji dialect spoken in many areas of northern Iraq differs from the Sorani 
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 dialect spoken among the rest of the Kurds.80 Majority of the correspondence 
between Kurds in Turkey and propaganda conducted by the PKK is in Turkish. The 
reason is that this is the only language that all Kurds understand in Turkey. Besides 
the language barriers within Kurds, the divisions between the many Kurdish tribes 
and the PUK/KDP conflict remains a major obstacle to long term Kurdish unity. 
However for the moment the Kurds in Iraq have managed to put these differences 
aside, this therefore greatly increases their political power against their divided 
rivals in the country. We will now analyze these separate political forces at play 
within post-war Iraq. 
The long and painful process leading up to the first democratic elections in 
Iraq can be summed up with a look at some important milestones. It is important to 
get a good understanding of these steps because each of them had to be achieved by 
trying to find a compromise between the many political actors within the country, 
and had to be achieved under strict deadlines.  
 
3.3 Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) 
Months before the March 19th, 2003 invasion of Iraq was to take place, the 
Pentagon was busy creating the ‘Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance’ (ORHA). It was created in order to take charge after the invasion was 
successfully completed in Iraq. Any damaged infrastructure such as oil fields, 
hospitals, roads, and vital telecommunications networks would have to be repaired 
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 and maintained by the ORHA.81 It was made up mainly of civilian experts such as 
engineers, technicians and other needed workforce to carry out the jobs which 
required technical expertise. The man in charge of the ORHA was Retired General 
Jay Garner.82 He was handpicked for the job due to his past experience which 
included heading the humanitarian mission, ‘Operation Provide Comfort’. His 
familiarity with the geography and culture of Iraq was seen by the Pentagon as a 
guarantee that things would go smoothly after the hostilities came to an end. 
However, what transpired after the invasion was a different story. As victory bells 
were ringing in Washington due to the speed and effectiveness of the invasion of 
Iraq, and the fall of the Saddam regime was achieved with little resistance, it was 
thought that Iraqis would eagerly and peacefully transition into a democratic 
regime. What followed the invasion was something of a different nature, which 
could be described as the total collapse of authority and laws, widespread looting 
and anarchy, and a chaotic environment to which the Coalition forces did not have 
a well devised plan to deal with. In an estimate made several months after the 
looting had subsided, it was believed to have cost the Iraqi people around 12 
Billion US Dollars.83 Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense at the time, 
described the anarchy and looting in the streets of Iraq by the following words; 
“Stuff Happens…Its untidy, and freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make 
mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things.”84 Rumsfeld naturally did not 
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 admit that both the White House and Pentagon were caught unprepared by the 
events that unfolded. According to George Packer, author of the book, ‘The 
Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq’, the ORHA were a “skeletal, disorganized, 
impecunious crew of fewer than 200 unarmed civilians wondering around in the 
dust of the Republican Palace (ORHA headquarters) searching for colleagues 
because they didn’t have phones to call one another”.85  
Amid the confusion, both the ORHA and the military patrolling the streets 
could do no more than watch the looting go on. The troops’ ‘Rules of Engagement’ 
only gave them permission to fire when fired upon and protect the sensitive 
location of the Ministry of Oil. Other than that, all the museums, other ministries, 
hospitals, schools were ransacked by mobs of Iraqis.  
 Seeing that General Jay Garner was being overwhelmed by the events 
transpiring in ‘post-hostilities’ Iraq, the Bush administration decided to appoint 
Paul Bremer, a counter terrorism expert, as the President’s Special Envoy to Iraq. 
On May 6th, 2003 it was officially announced that Ambassador Bremer would take 
the job from General Jay Garner.86 The ORHA would come to an end, and the 
‘Coalition Provisional Authority’ (CPA) would take its place.  
 
3.4 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Ambassador Paul Bremer  
As soon as Bremer came to office in Baghdad, he made two important 
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 decisions on behalf of the CPA. The first of these was the ‘CPA Authority Order 
No.1: De-Baathification of Iraq’.  The law stated, “Top three layers of management 
in every national government ministry, affiliated corporation, and other government 
institutions, including universities, institutes, and hospitals would be reviewed for 
possible connection to the Baath Party.” 87 What this law basically meant was that 
all qualified civil servants in the country were now out of their jobs. During the 
Saddam regime, senior level managers in all government institutions were Baath 
Party members. Although some of them were hardcore Baathists, most were not. A 
comparison could be made here to the era of the Soviet Union when almost 
everyone who wanted to further their career was a part of the Communist Party. In 
Iraq people joined the Baath Party because the system left them little choice. 
Ambassador Bremer, partly due to his lack of knowledge of the Iraqi culture and 
history, and partly due to the pressure from the Shiites and the Kurds, passed such a 
law. It was a self destruct button that he pushed because now not only did the 
country not have the infrastructure necessary due to the looting that took place, it 
also didn’t have the manpower to run its ministries, hospitals, factories and other 
related sectors.  
Paul Bremer than passed another CPA order called, ‘CPA Order No. 2 – 
Dissolution of Entities’. This law dissolved the Defense Ministry, National Security 
Ministries, the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the Baath Party 
Militia, and Fedayeen Saddam (Specially trained Saddam loyalist security force).88 
                     
87 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, Malcolm McConnell, ed., (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pg.40  
88 Bremer, My Year in Iraq, Malcolm McConnell, ed., (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pg.57 
52 
 In other words it dissolved Iraq’s military with a single ‘order’. This meant that a 
country of 26 million people already with prevalent sectarian hatred, which had 
experienced a total collapse of their regime, had to be secured by the Coalition 
Forces alone. There simply were not enough troops on the ground to make this 
possible. Therefore this was an impossible task, and a reason why the United States 
tolerated ‘militias’ of the Kurds and Shiites to operate freely in Iraq. The militias 
would take a portion of the burdens and responsibilities off of the Coalition forces 
in these initial stages of the occupation of Iraq. When Bremer dissolved the Iraqi 
Army, it was met with joy by the Shiites and the Kurds. Below is a conversation 
Bremer had with Messud Barzani shortly after the ‘Dissolution of Entities’ order 
was issued, in Barzani’s home at Salahaddin, Iraq:    
Barzani: Congratulations on formally abolishing Saddam’s army. It’s a 
wonderful thing you’ve done. It proves that the Coalition is serious about 
creating a new and united Iraq. 
Bremer: You know, some were encouraging us to reconstitute a smaller 
version of Saddam’s army. 
Barzani: That would have been a big mistake, we Kurds would have left 
Iraq, seceded. We’ve fought the Baathists’ army from the beginning. For 
twelve years, we’ve enjoyed autonomy. If they returned, we’d fight 
again…a civil war. 
Bremer: Syria, Turkey, Iran…and here we are in Iraq, all countries with 
Kurds. That civil war would have become a regional war. 
Barzani: But now we have escaped this disaster. 89
 
 This conversation shows us that what Bremer did by dissolving the army 
was satisfy Kurdish demands. The Kurdish leader Barzani, while portraying 
himself as someone who is willing to cooperate with the Coalition authorities for 
the good of Iraq, was actually in the process of blackmailing the Coalition 
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 Provisional Authority. Kurdish demands ranged from maintaining their 
autonomous status under a federal Iraq, to the classifying of their militias as 
security forces of the Kurdish Regional Government, thus preventing the CPA from 
asking them to turn in their arms. They also wanted guarantees of significant 
representation in a possible future interim government of Iraq, to receive a larger 
portion of national oil revenues due to the ‘unfair’ distribution of oil income under 
the Saddam regime, and the holding of a referendum in Kirkuk to determine its 
future status. All of these demands were put on the table, with no room for 
compromise. In return, they kept the Kurdish regions of Iraq stable and free from 
the violence that gripped the rest of the country. As a result, the United States, 
seeing the only stable region in the country under Kurdish control, did their utmost 
to keep the Kurds active and cooperative in Iraqi politics. Messud Barzani and Jalal 
Talabani were able to put their differences aside and represent a united front to 
other groups in Iraq thus increasing their bargaining power. 
 
3.5 Governing Council 
With Bremer in charge, the CPA then proceeded on selecting a ‘Governing 
Council’ to help govern Iraq. It would be made up of prominent Iraqis who had 
made their names while touring the seminars and conferences conducted by 
opposition groups before the March 2003 invasion. This Council would remain in 
charge until an interim government was formed and sovereignty handed over to the 
Iraqis. Here is what Bremer had to say about the criterion for selecting the members 
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 of the Governing Council:  
We assumed that the Shia would have to be a majority of the Council, since 
they made up 60% of the population. We also needed to find effective, 
patriotic Sunni members. Finding them brought us face to face with a major 
structural problem, lack of credible Sunni leaders. The Kurds would require 
representation in rough proportion to the Kurdish/Arab population, about 
20%. There were Christians, Turkmen and other minorities whom it was 
important to include in some way. 90
 
 On July 13th, 2003, the Governing Council was announced. It would remain 
in office until June 1st, 2004 after which the Iraqi Interim Government took charge. 
The Governing Council was made up of 13 Shiites, 5 Sunni Arabs, 5 Kurds, 1 
Turkmen, and 1 Assyrian.91 As soon as the Council was formed, there were 
disagreements on which group or person would become president and for how 
long. Through deliberations and compromises the system of a rotating presidency 
was decided upon among select members of the Council.  
 Let us briefly look at some of these figures which made up the rotating 
presidency. The group included Ahmad Chalabi, who was a secular Shiite Arab and 
head of the former opposition group ‘Iraqi National Congress’. Eyad Allawi also a 
secular Shiite, was included in the presidential cycle. He had lived in exile during 
the Saddam years and was an active opposition leader. The other secular Shiite 
included was Ibrahim al-Jaafari, spokesman of the Islamic Dawa Party.  
Among the secular Sunni Arab members was Adnan Pachachi. He was the 
former Iraqi Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1959 to 1965 
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 and former Foreign Minister of Iraq from 1965 to 1967. In the year 1971, he was 
exiled by the Saddam regime.92 Gazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer was also a Sunni 
member of the rotating presidency. He is head of the Sunni Shammar tribe.93  
The Kurds were represented by Messud Barzani, head of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. 
Another Kurd which represented a more religious ideology on the rotating 
presidency was Mohsen Abdel Hamid, he was Secretary General of the Iraqi 
Islamic Party.94  
Among those representing the religious Shiite were; Mohammed Bahr al-
Ulluom, an Arab Shiite Islamic leader, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, a Shiite Arab 
theologian and head of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and Izzedine 
Salim, another Shiite Arab theologian.95  
While in power, the Governing Council also created the ‘Law of 
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’, or otherwise 
known as TAL. This document would serve as a basis for the future constitution of 
Iraq and would be a guideline for the Governing Council during their time in office. 
The handover date for sovereignty to an Iraqi government was established as June 
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 30th, 2004 in an agreement by all sides, called the ‘November 15 Agreement’.96  
 
3.6 Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period 
(TAL) 
Due to TAL’s temporary status, we will not go into the document in much 
detail, however some important points it contained that would make up the basis of 
the future constitution of Iraq will be briefly looked at.  The document contained 62 
articles in total, focused primarily on the protection civil rights and liberties.  
Article 2:  ‘The elections for the National Assembly should take place no 
later than January 31st, 2005’, 
This article set a strict timeline for elections to be conducted in Iraq. The 
main aim for this clause was to satisfy Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini al-Sistani, 
spiritual head of the Iraqi Shiites who insisted on an elected body writing the 
constitution of Iraq, instead of an appointed one. 
Article 9: ‘Arabic and Kurdish are the official languages of Iraq’, 
 There was not much choice on this matter as all sides were forced to accept 
such a deal, or else the Kurdish parties threatened secession from Iraq.  
Article 61: ‘Assembly should write a permanent constitution no later than 
15 August, 2005. The draft permanent resolution would be presented in a 
referendum to the Iraqi people by 15 October 2005.’, 
 By putting clear dates for the writing of the constitution by an elected body, 
and it being submitted to the Iraqi people for approval, the Coalition Provisional 
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 Authority wanted to make sure no lengthy debates or disagreements stalled Iraq’s 
transition to democracy. Without strict timelines, the Governing Council could 
never function effectively. There were constant disagreements and last minute 
requests made by all sides, which often resulted in nothing but a waste of time and 
effort due to their inability to compromise. Lack of trust plagued all levels of Iraqi 
society, and policy makers were no exception to the rule.  
Article 53: ‘Recognizes the current government of Kurdistan as the 
legitimate government of the Kurds, and allows it to continue to exist within the 
new federal state.”, 
 While Turks were arguing about ‘Red Lines’ in their foreign policy, and 
while the Turkish government was trying to portray an image to Turks as a tough 
and uncompromising government that would look after Turkey’s interests, across 
the border in Iraq the Kurds were laying the foundations for a possible future 
secession from Iraq. The above article was a sign of things to come. The Kurdish 
peshmerga were now the official police force of the Kurdish Regional Government, 
no longer considered as a militia by the CPA or the Shiites. This meant that the 
forced removal of Arabs and Turkmen population from cities such as Kirkuk and 
Erbil were now conducted by the police force of the Kurdish Regional 
Government. As we will look at later during our analysis of the draft ‘Petroleum 
Law’ and the new permanent constitution of Iraq, Kurds would enjoy such a high 
level of autonomy and economic independence from Iraq that it was in a sense 
already an independent state. We will also look at what happened to those so called 
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 ‘Red Lines’ in Turkish Foreign policy which were not only being violated but 
rather shredded into pieces in northern Iraq. 
Article 25:  ‘The natural resources of Iraq declared to belong to all the 
people of all the regions and governorates of Iraq. Their management is 
required to involve consultation with the governments of the regions and the 
administration of the governments. Revenue resulting from their sale 
through the national budget is required to be distributed in an equitable 
manner proportional to the distribution of the population throughout the 
country, and with ‘due regard’ for areas that were unjustly deprived of these 
revenues by the previous regime.’, 97  
 All seems normal in the above article until we get to the last part. That last 
sentence in the article meant that the Shiites and the Kurds would get well above 
the amount that was proportional to their population. The Sunni areas in Iraq 
already low in natural resources such as oil, the low percentage of Sunnis in the 
country, all meant that once again the Sunnis were getting the short end of the stick. 
We will look into in detail the proposed oil revenue sharing plan later in the paper. 
Now that we have looked at important decisions made by the TAL 
document, let us get back to the process of the handing over of sovereignty to the 
Iraqi government and the eventual democratic elections that would take place in 
Iraq. 
 
                     
97 “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL)”,The Coalition 
Provisional Authority, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html  
59 
 3.7 Handover of Sovereignty 
The ‘November 15 Agreement’ mentioned earlier on, besides setting up a 
fixed date on the hand over of sovereignty to the Iraqis, had also drawn up a plan to 
select an interim assembly based on nationwide caucuses that would write the new 
constitution.98 However, in the end, the ‘November 15 Agreement’ was tossed 
aside because the CPA and Governing Council could not satisfy Grand Ayatollah 
Ali Husseini al-Sistani. Sistani did not like the idea of the body that would write the 
constitution being selected by the Governing Council. He made it abundantly clear 
that the new constitution had to be written once democratic elections were held 
enabling an elected instead of a selected body to draft the constitution. Lakhdar 
Brahimi, the United Nations envoy to Iraq brought in to help assess when healthy 
and fair elections could be conducted within Iraq, played an instrumental role in 
bringing all sides to a compromise on the issue.99 Lakhdar Brahimi agreed with 
Bremer that early elections could not be conducted in Iraq due to the level of 
violence and unprepared status of the relevant ministries. However, Brahimi also 
helped bring all sides back on the negotiating table and reach an agreement. It was 
decided that the Governing Council and the CPA would select an ‘Interim 
Government’ to take charge of Iraq on the original hand over of sovereignty date 
decided upon in the ‘November 15 Agreement’. This interim government would 
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 then pave the way for elections to be held by January 31st, 2005.100 The interim 
government would operate under the TAL document, and the ‘Transitional 
Government’ to be elected by January 31st, 2005 would write a ‘draft’ constitution. 
This draft constitution would then be submitted to the Iraqi people through a 
referendum on 15th of October, 2005, if approved allowing for the election of a 
permanent government.101 As we have seen, the whole process is very complicated, 
but in Iraq almost everything is.  
The hand over of sovereignty to the Iraqis took place two days earlier than 
scheduled, on June 28th, 2004, mainly as a move to prevent terrorist attacks on the 
by then well publicized date of the ‘hand-over’. The new interim government was a 
mosaic constructed to satisfy the Kurds and the Shiites. The Sunni Arabs were 
given the position of President, Gazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawar was given the largely 
ceremonial post.102 But the key positions were divided up between Shiites and 
Kurds. Messud Barzani and his Kurdistan Democratic Party were given the 
following positions: Vice President – Rowsh Shaways, Foreign Minister – Hoshyar 
Zebari. Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan were given the Ministry of 
National Security, Barham Salih becoming the new minister. The Shiites were 
given the following: Eyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord – Prime Minister, 
Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the Islamic Dawa Party – Vice President, and Adel Abdul 
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 Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) – Finance Minister. The 
Turkmen were once again ignored, as the only Turkmen who held a post under the 
Governing Council, Rashid Mindan, continued his symbolic role as Minister of 
Science and Technology.103 It was a ministerial position with relatively no 
importance in the grand scheme of things, and was given just to demonstrate that 
there was a ‘Turkmen’ representation.    
 The interim government remained in office until the first democratic 
elections in Iraq on January 30th, 2005. 
 
3.8 January 30th, 2005 National Elections in Iraq 
These first democratic elections in Iraq were aimed at electing an Iraqi 
‘Transitional Government’ which would draft a permanent constitution and 
establish the necessary conditions for the election of a permanent government. The 
elections were conducted in a relatively peaceful manner even though almost all the 
Sunnis boycotted the elections. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (al-Qaeda terrorist who was 
killed during a U.S. air strike in June, 2006) had issued public statements before the 
elections that called the Iraqi elections a polytheist, Zionist plan to replace God 
with Shiite ‘politician pigs’.104 Leaflets were distributed all over the streets. One of 
those leaflets read, “We will wash the streets of Baghdad with voters blood. Those 
of you who think you can vote and runaway, we will shadow you and catch you, 
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 we will cut off you and your children’s heads.”105 Other leaflets contained similar 
threats, mainly aimed at the Sunni community to boycott the elections. These 
threats combined with a loss of faith in any sort of victory in the elections, caused a 
wide scale Sunni boycott.  
The Shiites, on the other hand, realized the importance of the elections right 
away. They mobilized mainly in southern Iraq, which is under British control. 
Their militias took control of the streets, and the local population felt relatively safe 
to go and cast their vote on election day. Iran provided aid and support to most of 
the Shiite political parties, but the main Iran backed party was the Supreme Islamic 
Iraqi Council (SIIC). The SIIC were extremely cooperative with the coalition forces 
at the time, and wanted to control all of Iraq by winning the elections through their 
power base in the south. SIIC entered the elections through an alliance of a number 
of Shiite parties called the ‘United Iraqi Alliance’. The main parties in the alliance 
were the Islamic Dawa Party and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). 
The Islamic Dawa Party was a conservative Shiite party formed in 1957 in 
Najaf.106 One of the parties senior members, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari became the first 
democratically elected Prime Minister of Iraq after the January 30th, 2005 elections. 
Nuri al-Maliki, current Prime Minister of Iraq, is the head of the Islamic Dawa 
Party.  
The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) on the other hand is the largest 
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 Shiite party in Iraq, formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The leader of the Party was Ayatollah Mohammed 
Baqr al-Hakim until a car bomb resulted in his death on August 29th, 2003.107 
Current head of the SIIC is Ayatollah Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, brother of the late 
Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim. According to the report published by the ‘Iraq Study 
Group’, the SIIC is in favor of an autonomous Shiite region in southern Iraq. This 
therefore allowed them to turn a blind eye for Kurdish moves for autonomy as long 
as their intentions were also respected by the Kurds. The party controls the 
powerful ‘Badr Militia’, an armed wing of the SIIC.    
When taking a look at the Shiite, Arab political actors in Iraq, the figure of 
Moqtada al-Sadr also needs to be analyzed. Al-Sadr has a lot of influence in Iraqi 
politics, and is known to be an Iraqi nationalist. His militia, the ‘Mahdi-Army’ is 
considered as one of the most dangerous armed groups in Iraq by the U.S. 
administration.  
The history of the al-Sadr family in Iraq has always been one of leadership 
status among Iraqi Shiites, a factor that often made them the target of 
assassinations, arrests and persecution by the Baath regime. Moqtada al-Sadr’s 
father in law, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Sadr, was the undisputed leader 
of the Iraqi Shiite community until his death in 1980.108 Following the demise of 
Baqr al-Sadr, Muqtada’s father became the next Grand Ayatollah. He was able to 
put together a huge following, composed mainly of poor Shiites within Baghdad. In 
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 February of 1999, as he was driving through the streets of Najaf with two of his 
sons, he was ambushed by gunmen and shot to death along with his sons.109 His 
youngest son, Muqtada al-Sadr was not with them at the time, and assumed the 
leadership status of his father’s following. Moqtada al-Sadr did not have the 
religious credentials his father had, but nevertheless he was able to rise to the top  
and control the ‘Mahdi Army’. Moqtada opposed the U.S. occupation of Iraq and 
labeled the Iraqis cooperating with Coalition forces as “traitors”.110 This quickly 
made him one of the most feared men by the Coalition forces, because not only was 
he a prominent Shiite that opposed the U.S. presence in Iraq, but he was also too 
popular in his home town of Sadr city for the Coalition forces to engage. Sadr city 
was the name given to a Shiite slum in the capital Baghdad, during the Saddam 
regime it was know as Saddam city. Almost all of the public services and 
healthcare in Sadr city were taken over by al-Sadr’s militia, ‘Mahdi Army’. By the 
time of the Second Gulf War, al-Sadr had a couple of thousand militiamen, who 
were well dug in within Sadr city and Najaf, one of the holiest cities for Shiites. 
Here is what Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) from May 11th, 2003 until June 28th, 2004, had to say about Moqtada al-
Sadr; “We had to arrest Moqtada and dislodge his militia from the holy cities, but 
the risks were too great. There could be riots not only in Sadr city, but also in other 
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 Shiite cities in the south.”111 Although coalition troops did engage al-Sadr’s ‘Mahdi 
Army’, Moqtada was never arrested.  
Moqtada al-Sadr is known to have a ruthless approach to any potential 
rivals that might damage his status as one of the leaders of Iraqi Shiites. Currently 
only Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini al-Sistani holds a more prestigious position in 
the eyes of the Iraqi Shiites. Moqtada tends to leave Sistani alone because Sistani is 
reluctant to get directly involved in politics, and tends to run things behind the 
scenes. As stated before, the Shiite community in Iraq is far from being a 
homogenous entity. There is a constant struggle for power between the Iran backed 
al-Hakim camp, and the nationalist al-Sadr forces. Sistani has close links to Iran 
and is known to dislike al-Sadr. But neither al-Sadr or Sistani took the risk of 
directly becoming entangled in a conflict with each other. Leading up to the 
January 30th, elections of 2005 in Iraq, both Sistani and al-Sadr opted to refrain 
from running as candidates. Ayatollah Sistani was the architect behind the ‘United 
Iraqi Alliance’. His thoughts and decrees on who could run in the elections and 
who could not, within the Shiite alliance, were the final word. Al-Sadr, on the other 
hand, sat behind the scenes and waited for the outcome of the elections. He did not 
publicly oppose the ‘United Iraqi Alliance’. Al-Sadr had despised the Baath 
regime, but he was never sympathetic to those that had there allegiances to Iran. 
During the Iran-Iraq war, the Sadr camp was active in fighting Iranian forces. 
Therefore, Moqtada was stuck in a contradiction during the elections. He wanted 
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 Shiites to gain power; however he did not want the SIIC emerging as the only 
power. As a result, he tried to keep everyone guessing as to his true intentions until 
after the elections, when he could bandwagon with the victors of the election in 
order to bolster his political status. As expected, Moqtada al-Sadr emerged from the 
elections in 2005 with a stronger political status than he had before the elections.  
In order to get a true understanding of the makeup and dynamics of the 
‘United Iraqi Alliance’ we have looked at the Islamic Dawa Party, the SIIC and 
Moqtada al-Sadr. But the most important figure of the movement was Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Husseini al-Sistani. He is a man with the most influence in Iraqi 
politics today. He refuses to admit that he has anything to do with politics, instead 
he uses his religious credentials to portray an image of being the spiritual leader of 
the Shiite community. Without his approval and consent, not even the smallest 
political appointment can be made in Iraq.  
The Kurds also enjoyed considerable success in the first democratic 
elections of Iraq. Like the Shiites, they entered the elections with an alliance of two 
main political parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The alliance was called the ‘Democratic Patriotic 
Alliance of Kurdistan’. The alliance included other smaller Kurdish parties such as; 
Chaldean Democratic Party, Kurdistan Communist Party, Kurdistan Islamic Group, 
Kurdistan Social Democratic Party, Kurdistan Toilers Party.112 The main points in 
the alliance’s political requests and positions were an insistence on a federal 
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 democratic regime put in place in Iraq, the protection of the Kurdish Regional 
Government’s autonomous status, providing for adequate Kurdish representation in 
the federal government, seeking a share of national revenues for Kurds which also 
aims to correct past imbalances during the Saddam regime, holding a referendum 
for the status of ‘disputed’ territories, and assuring a share of national oil revenues 
that satisfies the Kurds demands.113
 There is an interesting point in this alliance that needs further clarification. 
This is because it also included a Turkmen party by the name of the Iraqi Turkmen 
Brotherhood Party. At first glance, it might seem as if the need for Turkmen 
participation in the electoral process led the Kurds to accept Turkmen membership 
into their alliance. However, this was not the case. First of all, the main Turkmen 
political party in northern Iraq is not the above mentioned Iraqi Turkmen 
Brotherhood Party. There are numerous other Turkmen political parties in Iraq, 
three of which have much more influence and political power than the Iraqi 
Turkmen Brotherhood Party. 
 
3.9 Turkmen Political Parties   
The first of these is the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). Led by Saadettin Ergeç, 
it is the most active and representative of the Turkmen political parties.114 It has 
always been against a federal Iraq due to fears of an increase in the Kurdish 
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 nationalist secessionist movement. The ITF opposes the referendum in Kirkuk, and 
has claimed that voting irregularities occurred during the January 30th, 2005 
elections. Below is a segment of an official protest made by the ITF to the 
‘Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq’ shortly after the elections were 
conducted: 
 
We are sorry and deeply concerned to inform you that too many 
irregularities have been committed during these elections which no doubt 
will affect its results. Despite your declarations to the press and to the 
television news networks that the elections have been `almost' clean and 
fair, we have encountered numerous problems to vote, have observed 
multiple irregularities in voting centers and have been subjected to illegal 
behavior and unfair treatments in polling centers in our region, in the 
provinces of Kerkuk, Mosul, Salahaddin and Erbil.115
 
 The ITF has close links to Turkey, to which it looks for support in its quest 
to put a stop to Kurdish moves of forcibly removing the Turkmen population from 
traditionally Turkmen cities, in order to gain an advantage in the upcoming 
referendum to decide that status of these territories. We will look into such 
allegations in our section on the analysis of the role of the Turkmen in Iraq.  
Another of the Turkmen parties is the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, led 
by Abbas al-Bayati. It is a party that garners the support of the Shiite segment of 
the Iraqi Turkmen. The Turkmen community is divided in half among sectarian 
lines of Sunni and Shiite. Abbas’s party was a part of the ‘United Iraqi Alliance’ 
during the elections along with a smaller affiliate that went by the name of 
                     
115 “Iraq Turkmen Culture Association”,  http://kerkuk.dk/ENG/0005.htm , (accessed September 
2nd, 2007)  
69 
 Turkmen Loyalty Movement. 116 While opposing the ‘Kurdification’ of Kirkuk and 
other disputed territories in the region, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen are in 
favor of a Shiite dominated federal democratic system, in which the Kurds power 
and secessionist ambitions are kept in check.  
The Turkmen People’s Party, a smaller political party but nevertheless more 
influential than the Iraqi Turkmen Brotherhood Party that had taken part in the 
‘Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan’, is also active in Iraqi politics. It has a 
position slightly different than the ITF in that it supports a federal Iraq, so long as 
Turkmen rights are respected.  
So far our analysis of the developments in Iraq after the U.S. led offensive 
in March of 2003 has given us a perspective on the events that led up to the first 
democratic elections in Iraq and the parties which have or have not participated in 
the elections. Let us now look at the outcome of the January 30th, 2005 elections. 
 
3.10 Outcome of the January Elections 
Before we look at the statistical data conveying the election results, a poll 
conducted by the ‘International Republican Institute’ in Iraq, in the period leading 
up to the elections, gives us a critical insight of the psychology of the Iraqi 
population at the time. According to the poll; 64.5% of the Iraqis stated they would 
participate in the elections, that percentage fell to 19.1 within the Sunni 
community. In the Shiite community, 77.3% stated they would vote in the 
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 elections. The Kurds on the other hand were 70.9% in favor of voting.117  
During the elections, the Shiites and Kurds went to cast their votes, and the 
results of the election gave all the power to their respective political parties. The 
Sunnis paid a heavy price for their boycott of the elections, as their already 
diminishing status as political players in Iraq was dealt another heavy blow.  
 The turnout of voters in the elections was 58% nationally, with 8.56 million 
votes cast. The ‘United Iraqi Alliance’ received 4.08 million votes, the ‘Democratic 
Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan’ got 2.17 million votes and the list of interim Prime 
Minister Eyad Allawi got 1.17 million votes.118 The following table illustrates how 
this translated to seats in the National Assembly after January 30th, 2005: 
Party/Coalition                                                 Seats in National Assembly 
 
United Iraqi Alliance…………………………………………..140 
The Democratic Patriotic Alliance 
of Kurdistan……………………………………………………..75 
The Iraqi List – Eyad Allawi……………………………………40 
Iraqiyun Party…………………………………………………….5 
Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF)……………………………….……….5 
National Independent Elites and 
Cadres Party………………………………………………………3 
Iraqi Communist Party……………………………………………2 
Islamic Kurdish Society…………………………………………..2 
Islamic Labor Movement in Iraq……………………………….....2 
National Democratic Alliance…………………………………….1 
National Rafidayn List (Assyrian)………………………………...1 
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc (Sunni)...…………………….1         
                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                  119
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 After the elections, the new President of Iraq was Jalal Talabani of the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. As well will see later on, this was an ominous 
development for Turkey. The legitimacy of Talabani for formal diplomatic 
relations was always a subject of controversy in Turkey. The first government to 
hold official talks with Talabani was the Özal government. But that was when 
Talabani was met as the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, not the President 
of Iraq. This development complicated Turkish foreign policy decisions.  
 The post of Prime Minister went to Ibrahim al-Jaafari of the Islamic Dawa 
Party. The Vice Presidents were Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi 
Council (SIIC) and Gazi al-Yawar, former President and Sunni tribal chieftain. The 
Minister of Interior was the controversial figure of Bayan Jaberr, a radical Shiite 
who instigated the adoption of revenge attacks on Sunnis. The Foreign Ministry 
remained in the hands of Hoshyar Zebari of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. 
Messud Barzani, on the other hand, was happy with his role as the head of the 
Kurdish Regional Government. The important post of the Oil Ministry was given to 
the Shiite theologian Ibrahim Mohammed Bahr al-Ulloum. This division of the 
most important positions in Iraq being split up among the Shiites and Kurds meant 
that the seclusion of the Sunnis would continue. This meant that the rise in Sunni 
attacks on government establishments would also rise. The Oil Ministry was a 
position the Shiite alliance was insistent on from the beginning. As they got their 
wish, it meant that the Shiites were now in control of the world’s second largest oil 
reserves.  
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  The Turkmen, on the other hand, were able to get twelve of their candidates 
into the National Assembly. As a part of the ‘United Iraqi Alliance’ five Turkmen 
were selected, from the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF) there were three Turkmen and 
from the ‘Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan’ four Turkmen got into the 
National Assembly.120 The Ministry of Science and Technology that had been 
given to Turkmen politician Rashid Mindan now went to the Assyrian Basimah 
Yusuf Butrus.    
 The Transitional Government immediately set out to work on the new 
constitution. As outlined in the TAL document, they submitted the new proposed 
constitution to a referendum on October 15, 2005. The new constitution to set up a 
‘Democratic Federal Iraqi Republic’ got approved when 79% voted in favor in the 
referendum. The referendum results were striking in that it conveyed just how 
polarized and divided Iraq had become along ethnic and sectarian lines. In Kurdish 
and Shiite majority areas, the referendum for the draft constitution got approved 
with high margins, in some provinces as high as 97%. On the other hand within 
Sunni Arab areas, the results were against the draft Constitution.121  
 The results also show that the Turkmen voted mainly against the proposed 
constitution. The ‘United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq’ stated the following 
upon receiving the results of the referendum; “Results of the referendum have 
indicated the degree of political polarization in Iraq. This poses an ongoing 
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 challenge for all Iraqis and underscores the importance of an inclusive national 
dialogue.”122  
 
3.11 December 15th, 2005 Elections 
 Following the referendum, it was agreed that after the election of a 
permanent government, a ‘Constitution Amendment Committee’ would be set up in 
case any disagreements resulted which required compromise.123 As a result the 
elections for a permanent government went ahead on December 15th, 2005, under 
the guidance of the new constitution of Iraq.124  
 The main difference in these elections were the participation of a Sunni 
bloc of under the name of ‘Iraqi Accordance Front’. Following an Islamist agenda, 
it united formerly three separate political parties to form a coalition to enter 
elections. The Iraqi Islamic Party, Iraqi and the National Dialogue Council were the 
participants in the coalition.125  
 The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in the United States 
made this accurate observation about the difference of the December 15th, 2005 
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 elections as opposed to the January30th, 2005 elections. They stated, “The 
elections produced a parliament that more accurately represents the Iraqi 
population than the interim parliament did due to the Sunni Arab boycott of the 
January elections”.126 This was an accurate observation: However, it did not mean 
that the Sunnis were all actively participating in the political process in Iraq. There 
were still large segments of the Sunni Arab population that were discontent at the 
developments taking place.127 Unless the Shiites and the Kurds realized that their 
new found political power would not work without effective Sunni participation, 
the country would be entangled in further violence and risk falling apart. Perhaps 
the problem was that certain circles both within the Shiites and the Kurds had this 
ulterior motive on their agenda in the first place. The Kurds and the Supreme 
Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) were not afraid of the possibility of Iraq being divided 
into three parts, so giving up political power to prevent such an outcome was out of 
the question. As we will see, the cabinet which resulted from the elections kept 
almost all the important ministries either in Shiite or Kurdish hands. 
 The United Iraqi Alliance won 128 seats in the new Assembly. This 
allowed the Shiites to hold the post of Prime Minister through Nuri al-Maliki, the 
post of Interior Ministry through Jawad Bulani and the post of Oil Ministry through 
Hussein al-Shahristani. The Kurds through their ‘Kurdistani Gathering’ alliance 
were also victors in the elections. They won 53 seats in the assembly. The Deputy 
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 Prime Minister Barham Salih, the Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari as well as the 
President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani were all Kurds. The Ministry of Youth and Sports 
went to a Shiite Turkmen by the name of Jasem Mohammed Jafaar. But it is 
important to point out that he was a part of the ‘Kurdistani Gathering’ in the run up 
to the elections. Therefore his credibility among the Turkmen population is very 
low. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EMERGING IRAQ: THE TURKISH PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In the run up to the first democratic elections in Iraq, the Turkish 
government followed a policy of portraying itself as a supporter of democracy in 
the region. Turkey wanted to demonstrate that despite there being no chance of a 
favorable outcome of the Iraqi elections that would suit Turkish interests, it would 
still support the implementation of the Iraqi elections. Turkey took a gamble in that 
it was counting on the elections to be viewed as a failure by the international 
community. Since it was obvious from the beginning that only the Shiites and 
Kurds would emerge victorious from the elections, from the Turkish viewpoint the 
Arab world and major international powers outside of the United States and United 
Kingdom, would approach the elections results with caution. Below is a statement 
of the Spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Mr. Namık Tan, 2 days before 
the first elections in Iraq went ahead on January 28th, 2005: 
Iraqi Turkmen Society although conscious of the injustices imposed upon 
them throughout history, chose to act with a sense of responsibility to seek 
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 its rights within a politically united and territorially integral Iraq and 
decided to participate in the January 30th elections. In the aftermath of the 
intervention, we have been observing that certain Iraqi groups have been 
upholding ethnic and sectarian discrimination by tabling excessive demands 
and claims which may cause new and graver injustices under the pretext of 
ratifying unlawful practices of the past. The future status of Kirkuk and 
preservation of its pluralist character are among the sensitivities.” 128
 
As Tan suggests, there were two points at issue. First of all Turkey was 
keen on being seen by the international community as a staunch supporter of 
democracy in the region. The second point that this press statement brings up is the 
status of Kirkuk. Turkey has from the beginning viewed Kirkuk as a microcosm of 
Iraq, an ethnically mixed city that should be allowed to exist without being 
dominated by any ethnic group. The government of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) was trying to convey a message of being less hard-line and more in 
favor of a compromise that would favor both Turkish and Iraqi interests. However, 
this was the wrong strategy to be following at this juncture, as I will argue. 
Shortly after the elections another statement was made by the Foreign 
Ministry of Turkey: 
Today the preliminary results have been announced by the Independent 
Electoral Commission of Iraq on the national and provincial elections of 
Iraq. Low level participation by certain segments of the Iraqi society, non-
participation in several provinces, as well as imbalances and irregularities 
over the results in certain others, including Kirkuk, due to manipulations are 
issues that await earnest resolution. It has become obvious that certain 
elements of the Iraqi society attempted to manipulate the voting procedure 
and extracted illegal gains out of this practice. We expect that the UN will 
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 carry out its responsibilities in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1546. As 
a consequence, the Iraqi Transitional Assembly will not reflect the true 
proportionality of various segments of the Iraqi society. 129
  
As we see, this statement, the official position of the Turkish government 
after the election results were released, relied on two main points. The first point 
was that the elections were not conducted freely and fairly. The fact that many 
voting irregularities had occurred throughout the election meant that the results 
would not reflect Iraqi society as a whole. The second point was that non-
participation in several provinces, referring to the absence of Arab Sunni and 
Turkmen voters, meant that the elections were flawed to begin with.  
When we look at the before and after snapshot of Turkish Foreign Ministry 
views during the elections in Iraq, we see what Turkey aimed to achieve. Before the 
elections, Turkey wanted to give the impression that the elections in Iraq were a 
positive development and one that would be participated in by the Turkmen. And 
after the elections with the results overwhelmingly in favor of the Kurds and the 
Shiites, Turkey wanted to undermine the election results due to irregularities thus 
undermining the credibility of the new Iraqi government. This effort was a failure 
however because the international community viewed the first democratic elections 
in Iraq as a success. The relatively low degrees of violence and more than half of 
the country coming out the vote in despite of the risks involved were coined as a 
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 success story. The Turkish government had to accept the results and move on. So 
what went wrong? The answer to this question requires an analysis of Turkish 
foreign policy in the region that precedes the March-2003 invasion of Iraq. 
 
4.2 Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990’s 
The mistakes made during the 1990’s by Turkish Foreign policy decisions 
allowed the region of northern Iraq to solidify its autonomous status. When the 
allied ‘Operation Provide Comfort’ was initially created in July 24th, 1991, Turkey 
under President Özal and Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz thought that they could not 
stand by and watch Kurds get massacred at the country’s borders, so they decided 
to participate in the operation. The Kurdish rebellion, which had begun on 5th of 
March 1991 against the Saddam regime, had been a catastrophic failure. The 
rebellion began in the town of Ranya, and then spread all over Kurdish inhabited 
areas such as Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Dohuk and Mosul.130 The Iraqi defensive took 
hold in Mosul and than proceeded on crushing the rebellion in one city after the 
other. The peshmerga could not put up much of a fight and instead fled to the 
Turkish border. On the 5th of April 1991, Turkey allowed 250,000 Kurds to cross 
into its borders to seek refuge.131 Simultaneously, the UN passed Resolutions 687 
and 688, declaring a permanent ceasefire, condemning Baghdad and providing 
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 humanitarian aid to the refugees. Turkey had to spend around 1.6 Million US 
Dollars daily to give the necessary assistance to the Kurds.132 Around 5,000 troops 
were placed in Northern Iraq in the second phase of ‘Operation Provide Comfort’, 
under the name of ‘Poised Hammer’.133 This force would remain there along with 
air support and the no fly zones to protect Kurds from Saddam. The initial decision 
to take part in the operation by the Turkish government was justified because there 
was a humanitarian crisis unfolding in Turkey’s backyard, and something had to be 
done to stop it. However, this move, in combination with ‘Operation Northern 
Watch’, which had begun on January 1st, 1997, had turned northern Iraq into a 
refuge for PKK terrorists. The Turkish government had proceeded on extending the 
right of U.S. planes to use Turkish bases for enforcing the ‘no fly zone’, for every 6 
months for a period that amounted to almost 10 years.134 This was a mistake by 
Turkish policy makers. Due to the lack of authority in the region, not only did the 
KDP and PUK govern it as their own, but they also welcomed with open arms the 
PKK terrorists. The foundations for a possible future Kurdish state were laid in this 
time period. And it was done thanks to Turkish support. After noticing that the 
PKK was using the area of northern Iraq as a base for attacks into Turkey, and that 
the Kurds were moving towards future independence, an option for the Turkish 
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 government could have been to cancel the agreement granting the U.S. the rights to 
use Turkish bases. Such a move would have shown the United States that Turkey 
was serious on the issue of the PKK. Once this message had been delivered, the 
Kurds would have had to make concessions. They would have had to choose 
between taking care of Turkey’s security concerns and cracking down on the PKK, 
or risking either Turkish or Iraqi troop deployment into their regions. Without 
Turkish support and air bases, it would have been very difficult for the United 
States to easily enforce the no-fly zone in northern Iraq. An indicator as to how 
important Turkish support is to the Americans, can be seen by looking at a segment 
of the statements made by Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and 
Eurasian Affairs in his testimony before the ‘House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Subcommittee on Europe’ in March of 2007. Mr. Fried stated the following in 
Washington DC during his testimony: 
Turkey provides extensive logistics support to our troops in Iraq. This 
critical lifeline includes: the cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base, through which 
we ship 74% of our air cargo to Iraq; the land border crossing between 
Turkey and Iraq at the Habur Gate accounts for delivery to Iraq of a 
substantial portion of the fuel used by coalition forces and the fuel, food and 
water consumed by Iraqis. Turkey is the source of many imports of 
electricity into Northern Iraq. Turkey has used technical and financial 
assistance to train Iraqi political parties, to rebuild infrastructure and spark 
commercial development.135
 
All of the above statements emphasize the point that success in Iraq is not 
possible without Turkish assistance. In the realm of International Relations, this 
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 means leverage for Turkey. It has many cards it could play in order to make sure 
the issue of PKK terrorism and the status of Kirkuk are resolved favorably. What 
has Turkey achieved in its favor even though it had all these advantages? Soft 
handed tactics have not gained Turkey anything in this region for well over a 
decade now. Turkey provided all the assistance necessary during the first Gulf War 
and ended up suffering an estimated 6 Billion Dollars worth of losses due to the 
sanctions on Iraq.136 It is giving the same sort of assistance in the second war in 
Iraq, but now is on the verge of watching the creation of an independent Kurdish 
state right before its eyes. The ‘Red Lines’ it had drawn previously are being ripped 
to shreds. This time Turkey needs a more hard line policy, making it clear to all the 
major players in the region that Iraq’s territorial integrity, the status of Kirkuk, and 
PKK terrorism need to be resolved in manner that addresses Turkish security 
concerns and that does not disturb the balance of power and equilibrium in the 
region.  
 
4.3 Failures and Mistakes of Turkish Foreign Policy that have led to the 
Current Impasse 
Turkey’s number one foreign policy priority has been and still is, that Iraq 
remain a unitary state, and to prevent the Kurds from gaining control of the large 
oil fields in northern Iraq. Keeping this in mind, the question to be asked is, why 
and how has it contributed to the events leading up to the current status of the 
                     
136 Güney, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance From Cold War to War 
on Iraq”, Turkish Studies, Vol.6, No.3, pg.346 
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 region? And why are the number one foreign investors in the KRG region, Turkish 
companies? During an interview with a ‘Voice of America’ reporter, Nechirvan 
Barzani (PM of KRG) had this to say on the issue of Turkish investment in 
Northern Iraq, “Turkish companies hold more than 1 Billion US Dollars worth of 
investment in the Kurdistan region, and in the future they will continue to receive 
priority, including in the lucrative oil sector.” 137  
The Kurdish administration is clearly trying to divide Turkish public 
opinion by economically linking the Turks to the development projects in their 
region, thus winning over Turkish businessman while simultaneously destroying 
Turkish foreign policy goals. By giving Turkish companies incentives and lucrative 
contracts to invest in the Kurdish region, they are tying the Turkish economy to 
their region.  
A school of thought has emerged in Turkey which claims that good 
relations with the Kurdish Regional Government could benefit Turkish national 
interests. This argument claims that the KRG is already established and there to 
stay. Therefore, getting along with the KRG is the only viable alternative for 
Turkey. The AKP government is implementing policies that seems to go hand in 
hand with this school of thought. They claim that their effective foreign policy in 
the region is allowing Turkish companies to gain an important foothold on the 
development projects in Iraq, thus contributing to the Turkish economy and eroding 
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 Turkey’s export/import deficit. The mainly Turkish construction companies that are 
investing in northern Iraq are experiencing a level of prosperity unrivaled in their 
previous history. It seems like a win-win situation at first glance, with all sides 
happy. But it is anything but lucrative for Turkey in the long term. What Turkish 
investors are doing at the moment is building the infrastructure of the Kurdish 
Regional Government. Once the federal Iraqi draft ‘Oil Law’ comes into effect, 
provided that the current government in Turkey is in power, and pursues the same 
policies, Turkish companies will also be given lucrative contracts in that sector. As 
a result Turkish economy will be further linked to northern Iraq. But at the same 
time the Turks will have to get along with the Iraqi Kurds, irregardless of the status 
of Kirkuk, the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq, the situation of the Turkmen 
or the status of the autonomous Kurds in Iraq. If current policies are followed, the 
Turks will effectively be trading these short term lucrative contracts for long term 
Kurdish claims on the oil fields. The Kurds, once in possession of the right to the 
oil fields, could continue to award contracts to Turkish firms, but in the end it 
would mean that Turkey, despite seemingly winning the battle for contracts would 
have lost the war. What could be done instead is placing stringent controls on 
Turkish companies investing in northern Iraq. If the companies are found to be 
building strategically important infrastructure in the region, their operations could 
be halted on the grounds that it is against the national interests of Turkey. If we 
could make a comparison, could we imagine American firms building 
infrastructure for the Taliban in Afghanistan? Could the U.S. government ever 
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 allow this to happen? This is in fact what Turkish firms are doing at the moment. 
By building infrastructure in northern Iraq, they are strengthening the KRG, which 
in return is supporting the PKK and costing Turkish lives. The current lack of 
inspection and regulation of such contracts by the Turkish government comes as no 
surprise however as the overall Turkish foreign policy in the region has been 
plagued by short-sightedness and contradictions. 
 
4.4 Using Economic Leverage 
It was analyzed in the above section that the KDP were effectively trying to 
economically blackmail Turkey through the awarding of contracts to Turkish firms. 
However, if the KDP has a good hand when it comes to economic blackmail, 
Turkey has the ‘Royal Flush’ of hands, and has the potential to do major damage to 
KRG’s economy. The Habur border gate that is currently the only one linking Iraq 
and Turkey, passes through KDP territory. As a result, the annual income that goes 
to KDP through the regulation of this gate is estimated to be around 300 Million 
USD.138 There have been recent talks of closing this gate down and opening 
another border gate that passes through Turkmen territory at Ovaköy.139 Through 
this process, ‘two birds could be hit with one stone’ so to speak. The income of 
KDP will be dealt a drastic blow, while on the other hand the Turkmen will be 
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 given a valuable source of income. Given the track record of the KDP using force 
against the PUK to secure the border gate revenue in the former years, this would 
mean that they might resort to the same methods against the Turkmen. This is 
because this revenue at the moment is very important for the KRG. If force were to 
be used against the Turkmen, this could give the Turks the reason they need to 
enter northern Iraq and set up a buffer zone while simultaneously conducting a 
humanitarian aid mission to help the Turkmen. An offer similar to this was made 
by the former ‘Coordinator for the Fight Against Terrorism’, General Edip Başer. 
He stated: 
On the Turkish side, besides a military intervention to northern Iraq, there 
are other alternatives we can look at. For example if we were to close the 
Habur border gate for a few days this would mean a serious warning for 
them. If we stop giving them electricity and cut the flow of oil, they will 
understand the seriousness of the situation. Of course such actions will hurt 
us economically as well. But everyone has to be understanding if such a 
decision were to be made. If need be, the state should bear the burden of 
these actions. 140  
 
Talk of such action sparked an instant response from the KRG. They knew 
that such an action would have hurt them economically and left them literally in the 
‘Dark Ages’, with no electricity or flow of basic goods and oil. This is what KRG 
Minister of Trade, Mohammed Rauf, had to say on the issue: 
All goods coming from Turkey and other countries pass through the Habur 
border gate. As a result both sides make huge profits from the flow of 
goods. According to the 2005 statistics, Turkey made a profit in excess of 8 
Billion US Dollars in that year alone. In the coming months the KRG has 
made a decision to import 35 Million US Dollars worth of consumer goods 
and electricity equipment from Turkey. If the Habur border gate is closed, 
the Turkish economy will experience a huge battering. If on the other hand 
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 Turkey decides on a military operation on the Kurdistan region, all contracts 
of Turkish firms will be cancelled, Billions of dollars worth of damage will 
be suffered by Turks. Of course Kurds will suffer as well economically if 
the gate is closed, but we can resume our trade through alternative methods, 
for example through Iran or Jordan. 141  
 
Two things need to be said on the statements of the Kurdish minister. The 
first is the fact that the KRG felt a need to make this threatening statement on the 
same day as General Başer’s comments, which is an indicator as to how seriously 
they take the issue. And the second point is that Turkey can cope with the damages 
done by the closing of the gate for a brief period of time. Once the gate passing 
through Turkmen territory opens, it will be business as usual. But the Kurds would 
be left on their own to solve major financial problems.    
An MP of the opposition party in Turkey, Republican People’s Party (CHP), 
Erdal Karademir gave some striking information on how the electricity to the 
Kurds were provided. He stated: 
The electricity needs of PKK camps in northern Iraq are provided by 
Turkey. And if this were not enough, the electricity that is sold to the 
Turkish people for 9.5 cents is sold to the Kurds for 6.7 cents. The money 
lost in the process is being subsidized by the Turkish Treasury. The Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) government and the Turkish Energy Sector 
Arrangement Committee gave special permission to a company by the name 
of Black Sea Whole Sale Electricity Ltd. (KARTET) to export electricity to 
Iraq. KARTET is the only private company in Turkey which has permission 
to export electricity. 142  
 
Implying that there were close ties between KARTET and the AKP 
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 government, Mr. Karademir also went on to say:  
In order to export electricity cheaper to the Kurds than the price given to our 
own people, the AKP had to create a special law. The Official Newspaper 
Issue No. 25754 formally declared this law which enabled KARTET to 
begin its export operations. The electricity being used in northern Iraq is 
now paid for through the pockets of the Turkish people. 143
 
The economic prosperity the KRG enjoys today has a lot to do with Turkish 
assistance. As stated previously, the Turkish government has the potential to use 
northern Iraq’s reliance on its assistance to apply pressure on sensitive subjects, 
such as putting a stop to the presence of the PKK in the region of northern Iraq. 
Such options include temporarily or permanently closing the Habur border gate and 
using an alternate border gate passing through Turkmen territory. Also on the issue 
of the electricity provided to the KRG, the Turkish government needs to make clear 
to the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq that this assistance could come to a stop 
if the PKK camps in northern Iraq are not shut down.  
As this chapter demonstrates, Turkish foreign policy in Iraq needs to shift to 
a more hard-line policy. The next section of the thesis will focus on the region of 
northern Iraq. It will elaborate on the make up of the Kurdish Regional 
Government, the economic situation of the region, Turkmen minority and its goals 
as well as the status of Kirkuk. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
NORTHERN IRAQ 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Ever since 1991, the northern Iraq region has been under the effective 
control of the Kurds. The results of the elections in Iraq in 2005 and the status of 
Kirkuk are all issues that have developed due to the countless errors of Turkish 
foreign policy since the 1990’s. We could compare Turkish foreign policy in the 
region to a raft traveling along a river, making all the wrong turns at critical 
junctures and than finding itself a couple of meters from a huge waterfall 
wondering what went wrong.  Let us now look at the what constitutes the Kurdish 
Regional Government and the autonomous areas under its control in order to get a 
better understanding of the Kurdish policies and goals in the region.  
 
5.2 Kurdish Regional Government 
The areas that fall under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government 
are the governorates of Sulaymaniyah, Dohuk and Erbil. The capital of the KRG is 
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 Erbil and the contested area of Kirkuk falls outside its area of control. The current 
Prime Minister of the KRG is Nechirvan Barzani, nephew of the President of the 
KRG, Messud Barzani. The region has been prospering ever since its creation in 
1992 following the ‘Kurdish Uprising’ and international intervention.144 It is home 
to five universities, two airports, a regulated financial sector, and a developing 
energy sector based on the natural resources which fall under KRG territory.145 The 
KRG has created the ‘Kurdistan Development Corporation’ which seeks to attract 
foreign investment into the region, especially into the newly emerging oil sector. 
The brief description given above of the Kurdish Regional Government and 
the areas that fall under its control demonstrate two very important points. The first 
of these is that, as of now it has almost all the government institutions, 
infrastructure and necessary security force to secede from Iraq if it wishes to do so. 
All it is missing is the final federal ‘Oil Law’ to pass; it is still under the negotiating 
process. As soon as the Kurds secure a guarantee on the amount of oil revenues 
they will be receiving and determine the status of contested oil rich areas such as 
Kirkuk, they will have achieved complete economic independence from the central 
government of Iraq. Under such circumstances there will be no need to declare 
formal independence from Iraq, as their high level of autonomy both in the political 
and economic sense will have already granted them this status in an informal 
manner. The second important point is that none of this would have been possible 
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 without the assistance of Turkey as analyzed previously. 
Although the Kurds represent the only homogenous group in northern Iraq 
after the March 2003 invasion, this should not give the reader the impression that 
the Kurds have always gotten along with each other in northern Iraq. The truth is 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which have 
come to make up the Kurdish Regional Government, were sworn enemies in the 
decades leading up to their final ‘Unification Agreement of January, 2006’. Below 
is a segment of the unification agreement signed between the two on January 21st, 
2006:   
The supreme interests of the people of Kurdistan, today more than at any 
other time, requires its citizens to further unite their energies and 
capabilities. We face serious and delicate issues in the period ahead when 
the future of Kurdistan region will be decided as we move through the 
development of a democratic and federal Iraq. We must secure and 
guarantee the historic achievements of our people and the realization of our 
full and just rights by putting in place and implementing the permanent 
constitution, establishing a genuine federal and democratic Iraq, restoring 
Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour and other Arabized cities to the 
embrace of the Kurdistan Region.146  
 
The question to be asked here is how did these sworn enemies put their 
differences aside and manage to sign such an agreement? The answer to this is 
multifaceted; however, the role that Turkey played throughout the process was a 
vital part of the equation.  
The time period when most of the intense fighting broke out between the 
KDP and PUK was after the first Gulf War. This was due to their increasingly 
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 autonomous status after the Gulf War. There was a lot of money to be made in the 
region. The UN sanctions placed on Iraq had made possible the flourishing of a 
prosperous black market. All sorts of commodities, from oil to basic consumer 
goods, were smuggled both ways across the Turkish-Iraqi border each day. Those 
who controlled the border gates could also tax the goods flowing across the border. 
Millions of Dollars were being made each day just by running the black market 
flow of goods. Naturally both Talabani and Barzani had their eyes set on the 
money, and they could not agree on a plan to share the money. This resulted in 
heavy fighting between the two and often times both Turkey and Iran got involved 
by supporting one group against the other. After the toppling of the Saddam 
regime, both Talabani and Barzani realized that their conflict was hurting the wider 
Kurdish cause. As we see in the above unification agreement that this played a 
major factor in them putting their differences aside for the time being so that 
Kurdish regions could be represented as a stable and peaceful area to the 
Americans.  
 Northern Iraq is a region that also encompasses a large Turkmen minority. 
We had taken a look at their political parties in the previous sections, but let us now 
look at their historical origins and areas of settlement. This information is necessary 
in order for us to correctly analyze the status of Kirkuk and other disputed 
territories in Iraq. 
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 5.3 The Turkmen in Iraq 
Another mistake made by Turkish foreign policy in Iraq is related to the 
status of the Turkmen in the region. The Turkmen today are divided and without a 
credible leadership that could push for Turkmen rights within Iraq. Very little effort 
has been made by Turkey to unite the fractured and divided Turkmen community 
so that they could be represented in the autonomous region as a partner of the 
Kurds instead of their current status as a minority living in a minority. This, as a 
result, further weakened the Turkmen community’s hands in their struggle to 
explain to the international community their rightful claims on Kirkuk 
In order to understand Turkmen sensitivities on Kirkuk, we must first 
answer some important questions. Who are the Turkmen? What is their population 
within Iraq? When did they arrive in the region? What are their political goals?  
According to Ershad al-Hirmizi, a leading expert on the Turkmen history 
and politics, the Turkmen are descendants of the Turkic Oğuz tribes who originally 
came from Central Asia in consecutive waves and settled in Modern day Iraq.147Al-
Hirmizi states: 
The settlement of the Turkmen into Iraq took place in successive stages. As 
their numbers increased, so too did their stature. The Umayyad and Abbasid 
rulers recruited Turkmen for their armies, in which they became the rulers 
of Iraq, dividing their territory into numerous, independent emirates and 
states.148
 
When we look at the rise of the Umayyad dynasty and the Abbasid 
caliphate, we are brought to the time period of 660 AD, which was the period of 
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 Umayyad rise to power.149 One of the leading Arab historians, Albert Hourani 
states, “Turks descended from the nomadic pastoral peoples of inner Asia. They 
had begun to move across the north-eastern frontier of the domain of Islam during 
the ‘Abbasid’ period.”150
An Iraqi historian, Abdul Razzak al-Hassani’s views on the origins of 
Turkmen were: 
The term ‘Turkmen’ applied to those peoples who had settled on lands 
separating Kurdish territories from those of the Arabs. The limits of their 
settlement reached from a line running from the north-west at Telafer in 
Mosul to an area in south-east encompassing ‘Altoon-Kupri’(Altınköprü in 
Turkish) and ‘Tuz-Khunato’ in Kirkuk, Kizlerbat and Mandali in the Diyala 
province.151
 
 As we have seen from the research and statements of some of the leading 
historians and experts on Arab and Turkmen history, the entrance of Turkmen into 
the region goes back more than a millennium. This can help explain the 
sensitivities of the Turkmen people when Kurds allege that Kirkuk and its 
surrounding areas are and have always been Kurdish. This is simply a distortion of 
the facts, one that ignores the Turkmen reality in Iraq, and one that could have 
potentially disastrous consequences for the region. 
The bulk of the arguments in contemporary northern Iraq are based on 
demographics and the exact numbers of the ethnic groups in the region.152 This is a 
tricky subject because reliable figures on the numbers of each ethnic community 
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 are not present in Iraq. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu, an academic whose area of expertise is on 
the status of the Turkmen in Iraq, has stated that the only reliable source for 
weighing the population figures in the region is the 1957 Iraqi census.153  The 
reason this census stands out among the rest is that while it was conducted, the 
Turkmen population were permitted to register themselves as Turkmen.154 This 
opportunity was denied to them previously and later on due to the ‘Arabization’ 
policies in effect under the former regimes. According to the census, there were 
567,000 (9%) Turkmen in Iraq, out of a population of 6,300,000. The Kurds on the 
other hand numbered at 819,000 (13%).155
 A study by Ershad al-Hirmizli based on the above given numbers delivers 
very striking results; he states that by taking the population growth figures of Iraq 
in the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s into account which was around 3.2% (Arab Social 
and Economic Development Fund & Arab Monetary Fund statistics), adding to this 
the growth rate of 2.6% (Arab Social and Economic Development Fund & Arab 
Monetary Fund statistics) in the 1980’s, and 2.3% (Arab Social and Economic 
Development Fund & Arab Monetary Fund statistics) in the 1990’s, based on those 
statistics, the population of the Turkmen in Iraq should be about 2,038,662.156
 While it is impossible to arrive at the exact figures of Turkmen in Iraq until 
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 another credible census is conducted, the above given variables should give us 
some idea of the importance of the Turkmen community in Iraq. If Turkish foreign 
policy can effectively gather this community under a single roof of political 
representation, not only will they be able to play a much bigger role in Iraqi 
politics, they will also be crucial in determining the final status of Kirkuk.  
 
5.4 Kirkuk 
We have continuously referred to the importance of Kirkuk throughout the 
paper. Now let us examine why the city is so important for all Iraqis.  
 In March of 2007, the Iraqi government endorsed a relocation plan for 
Arabs who are currently located in Kirkuk.157 According to the plan, those Arabs 
who were supposedly brought into Kirkuk during the Saddam regime would now 
be located in southern Iraq. Although the program was dubbed ‘voluntary’, it was 
anything but. Both Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk are now experiencing a forced 
‘Kurdification’ of the city. Every Arab that agrees to relocate their family 
according to this new plan will be eligible for 15,000 U.S. Dollars compensation 
and a plot of land in their new location.158 Such policies have resulted in over 
150,000 Arabs leaving Kirkuk, and about 350,000 Kurds coming in to the city.159 
All of this is in preparation for a referendum that is supposed to take place by 
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 December of 2007. Article 140 of the new constitution of Iraq states the following 
on the issue of Kirkuk’s status;160
Article 140: 
First: The Executive Authority shall undertake the necessary steps to 
complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of 
Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. 
Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi 
Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional 
Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority 
elected in accordance with this constitution, provided that it completes 
(normalization and census and concludes with a Referendum in Kirkuk and 
other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), in a period 
not to exceed (the thirty first of December two thousand and seven). 161
 Several major think tanks and independent panels set up to review the 
situation in Iraq, such as the ‘Iraq Study Group’, have all recommended that this 
referendum be postponed to a later date. When Messud Barzani attended the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in May of 2007, he was 
asked a question on the status of the proposed Kirkuk referendum. Mr. Jon 
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 Wiersma, a Socialist MP from the Netherlands asked, “What guarantees can the 
Kurdish government give for a free and fair atmosphere for a referendum?” 
Messud Barzani’s reply was:  
All groups in Kurdistan will get to vote freely and according to their own 
conscience in the referendum. About 80% of Iraqis have agreed on the 
Constitution, and that Article 140 is the legal basis for dealing with the 
Kirkuk question. We need to go ahead with a referendum, as further delays 
can only destabilize the situation. Foreign intervention on this issue is 
unacceptable. 162  
 
 The Kurds in Iraq view the referendum in Kirkuk as their ticket to glory. 
They are mounting pressure on the United States so that the referendum could take 
place in the stated timeframe. The Turkish Foreign Ministry, on the other hand is 
confident that such a referendum will not be able to take place in 2007. Abdullah 
Gül, the current President of Turkey stated the following on the issue while he was 
Foreign Minister in May of 2007; 
It’s only a matter of time until the Kirkuk referendum gets postponed. Iraqi 
Constitution’s Article 140 will determine Kirkuk’s status. It should not be 
rushed into. It should take into account the welfare and future of all Iraqi 
people according to the will of all members of Iraqi parliament groups, with 
compromise in areas that will contribute to the final solution. 163
 
The position of Abdullah Gül and Turkey’s foreign policy objectives in 
Kirkuk are based on postponing the referendum to an undisclosed date. However it 
seems like they do not have a second phase to that plan. What will happen once the 
referendum is postponed? It will simply be delaying the inevitable. Once again, the 
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 wrong strategy is being followed by Turkey in regards to the referendum. A 
strategy closer to the one proposed by Turhan Çömez, a former MP of the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) needs to be adopted. During his term as an MP in 
AKP, Mr. Çömez was sent on a fact finding mission to northern Iraq. Upon his 
return from Kirkuk, he stated the following on his findings: 
PKK terrorists are settling in Kirkuk with heavy weaponry. Their 
Identification Cards are supplied by the KDP and PUK. The Turkmen 
community which I am in touch with state that a lot of PKK militants are 
coming into Kirkuk. The outcome of the referendum which will be 
conducted in Kirkuk by the end of this year is predetermined and the 
intention behind it is obvious. Turkey should declare now that it will not 
recognize the referendum. There are 50 Kurds coming into Kirkuk for every 
Arab that leaves. The demographic structure of the region was seriously 
changed in favor of the Kurds. 164  
 
The seriousness of the situation is very clear. The Turkish government 
cannot get what it wants in Kirkuk by postponing the referendum. And rejecting the 
results after the referendum has taken place will not help either. This strategy was 
followed after the 2005 elections, and it was a failure. The credibility of the 
referendum needs to be challenged well in advance of its implementation. Earlier 
this year the International Crisis Group, an NGO which has analyzed the issue of 
Kirkuk, said the situation was ‘deteriorating sharply’.165 The findings of the report 
suggest that a referendum being held this year is highly unlikely. They claim that 
the Federal government in Iraq has so far done very little to plan out such a 
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 referendum. The Kurdish Regional Government on the other hand is unprepared as 
well. A segment from the report lists the lack of preparation by the KRG;  
The government appears to have taken no steps to sort out the complex 
questions involved in staging a referendum. Those include. What is the vote 
supposed to determine? And what question or questions will be posed to 
voters? Should it be held only in Kirkuk and other disputed areas or in all 
Iraq? Which are the disputed ones? What are the boundaries of each of these 
territories? Who will be eligible to vote? Who will oversee the creation of 
the referendum itself? 166
 
 These are all very important questions and it appears that Barzani’s 
inexperience in such matters has led to a situation in which holding a referendum 
this year would need a miracle. The Kurds have been too busy changing the 
demographic structure of the city, they simply had no time left to focus on more 
technical matters. Here is what a local Kurd had to say regarding the forced 
migration into Kirkuk conducted by the KRG: 
Kurdish party leaders talk a lot about Kirkuk but they are not living there. 
Let them move there. And let them provide services to us. What I am 
looking for is security, business and good schools. But in Kirkuk there is 
nothing. They cannot persuade me to go back. So they are forcing people to 
move back by administrative means. If your family is originally from 
Kirkuk and you want to register your child, obtain a permit or get a civil 
service job, they tell you to move to Kirkuk. 167
 
Kirkuk has one of the largest oil fields in the world. The region around 
Kirkuk makes up for around 40% of Iraq’s total oil production and 70% of its 
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 natural gas production.168 So the stakes are high. Whoever controls these oil fields 
is set to become not only a major regional player in power politics but also a global 
player in the energy sector. Although the current constitution of Iraq claims that all  
of the natural resources of the country belong to the Iraqi people, there is a 
disagreement on the status of oil fields that have not yet been discovered. The 
Kurdish Regional Government claims that all energy resources discovered through 
the incentives of their government will be a property of the KRG. On the other 
hand both the Shiites and the Sunnis oppose such a move. The KRG has already 
begun awarding contracts to foreign firms for searching and developing the energy 
resources in the region. The Norwegian firm ‘DNO’, Turkish/Canadian partnership 
of ‘Genel/Addax’, Canadian firm of ‘Western Zagros’, Turkish/American 
partnership of ‘PetPrime’ and Turkish American partnership of ‘A&T Energy’ and 
‘Hunt Oil’ of Texas, have already signed contracts with the KRG regarding 
exploration of the oil fields in the region.169 So let us now look at the complicated 
draft ‘Oil Law’ of the federal government and the ‘Kurdistan Petroleum Law’ of 
the KRG. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONTROL OF OIL IN IRAQ 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Iraq has the world’s second largest proven oil reserves, estimated at 115 
Billion barrels of proven crude oil.170 Therefore this makes the new draft ‘Oil Law’ 
a very important milestone in Iraq. The United States and the KRG were hoping to 
have the federal government’s draft oil law approved within this year. However, 
this looks highly unlikely, as neither the Shiites nor the Sunnis have signed on to 
the law. Even though the KRG has already passed its version of the oil law, for the 
Kurdish Regional Government, in August of 2007, it seems that without the federal 
law, what they are doing by awarding contracts to foreign companies is currently 
illegal.171
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 6.2 Federal Draft Oil Law 
What the draft ‘Oil Law’ for Iraq was designed to do was establish a 
‘Federal Oil and Gas Council’. This Council would include representatives from 
the ministries of Oil, Treasury, Planning, and Cooperative Development. A 
representative of each province of Iraq, managers from Petroleum companies, the 
Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) representative, and other experts on the 
subject would meet under the Council regularly.172 All decisions regarding federal 
Oil laws, the awarding of contracts, the day to day operations of INOC, and the 
management of Iraq’s proven oil reserves would fall under the responsibility of the 
Council.  
The draft law would give each of the 18 provinces a percentage of the 
national revenue from oil based on their population. This method based on 
population of the provinces was constructed to get the Sunni Arabs on board.173 
Because the provinces that Sunni Arabs live in tend to have high populations, even 
though the number of Sunni Arabs compared to Shiite Arabs and Kurds are lower, 
it would not affect them to that extent, because the provinces that they live in also 
have segments of Shiite Arabs and Kurds. 
The draft ‘Oil Law’ starts off by declaring in the Preamble that ‘Article 111 
of the Iraqi Constitution declares Oil and Gas as the property of the whole nation in 
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 all Its Provinces and Governorates’.174 By stating this in the preamble, it was hoped 
to achieve a consensus that all provinces would turn in their revenue from 
‘existing’ oil fields into a pool regulated by the Federal government. It would than 
be distributed to all the provinces based on population figures as mentioned above. 
However Article 112 of the new Constitution of Iraq also has clear guidelines as to 
how this revenue will be distributed, it states; 
Article 112: 
First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and 
regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas 
extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a 
fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the 
country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged 
regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the 
regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that ensures balanced 
development in different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by 
a law.  
Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and 
governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic 
policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest 
benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market 
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 principles and encouraging investment. 175
Dr. Ashti A. Hawrami, Minister of Natural Resources of the KRG explained 
Article 112 of the Constitution by stating the following: 
The role of the federal authorities is only an administrative role confined to 
the handling; i.e.: exporting and marketing, of the extracted oil and gas from 
existing producing fields. This does not entitle the federal authorities to a 
broader role on operations. Article 112 does not mention anything about 
discovered undeveloped fields, or new fields, or unexplored areas.176
 
What the Minister of Natural Resources states in an indirect manner is that 
any new oil fields explored, discovered and operated by the KRG will not be a part 
of the revenue pool dictated by the federal government. In other words, KRG will 
be the sole beneficiary of new oil fields that are found in its region. Such 
statements have attracted the attention of major oil firms around the world. The 
KRG has already awarded several ‘exploration’ contracts to certain companies. 
This is the main disagreement behind the federal government’s draft ‘Oil Law’. 
The Sunni Arabs and certain segments of the Shiite Arabs declared that the Kurds 
had no right to award any contracts without the federal ‘Oil Law’ being passed. The 
strategy of the United States also backfired, because they thought the oil law would 
unite the country due to the provinces’ dependence on a federal pool of revenue 
distribution. The Kurds have tried to take advantage of the situation by making 
clear their claims on yet undiscovered energy sources in the region of northern Iraq, 
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 and as a result the draft oil law seems like it will remain as a draft for a long time to 
come. 
Another important point about the draft ‘Oil Law’ is that the KRG will be 
receiving not only the 17% of national oil revenues that are given to it as a result of 
its population, it will also receive additional revenues in order to make up for the 
‘injustices and mismanagement of investment’ during the Baath regime.177 This 
means that both the Shiites and the Kurds would be receiving well above their 
population ratios for an undisclosed period of time. This move naturally angered 
the Sunni Arabs.    
The draft ‘Oil Law’ when introduced to the Iraqi public was met by protests 
all over Iraq. An experienced Oil Industry worker and head of the Iraqi Oil 
Workers Union, Hassan Jumaa Awad al-Assad had this to say on the new law, 
during a protest in Basra: 
This law in fact destroys the achievements of the Iraqi masses and 
especially the Law Number 80 of 1961 and the nationalization of 1973. The 
new law will give unprecedented rights to the country’s vast reserves. We 
will lose control over Iraqi oil. Therefore, the social progress in Iraq will be 
curtailed, because the oil companies want huge profits; they are not 
concerned about the environment, wages or living conditions. Under the 
new Iraqi Law, contracts for up to 30 years could be awarded, giving the 
foreign investors a share of the new fields discovered. 178  
 
 The wide scale protests were not only coming from Sunni Arabs but Shiite 
Arabs as well. One of the reasons for the draft ‘Oil Law’ being stuck in 
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 disagreements is the above mentioned lucrative long term contracts that could be 
offered to foreign investors. With no regard for the Iraqi people, many giant oil 
companies are awaiting anxiously for the law to pass. This is the moment the oil 
sector has been waiting for, when major oil firms can finally get their hands on the 
riches that so many lives were lost for.  
 
6.3 Petroleum Law of the Kurdish Regional Government  
As stated before, while the federal oil law was under debate, the Kurds 
passed their own version called the ‘Petroleum Law of the Kurdistan Region’. The 
Kurds wanted to get this law into effect as soon as possible so that they could start 
handing out contracts to foreign firms. And with the promise of long term 
contracts, many firms lined up to get a piece. While presenting the draft ‘Kurdistan 
Petroleum Law’ to the ‘Kurdish Parliament’, Mr. Adnan Mufti said, “It is vital to 
the future of the Kurdistan Region that we have a modern, transparent, investor 
friendly petroleum law that maximizes returns to all peoples of Iraq.”179 He was 
clearly emphasizing the importance of this law being adopted quickly so that 
foreign investment in their region could go ahead.  
 Under the KRG Petroleum Law, Messud Barzani oversaw the creation of 
Kurdistan Exploration and Production Company (KEPCO), Kurdistan National Oil 
Company (KNOC), Kurdistan Oil Marketing Organization (KOMO), and 
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 Kurdistan Organization for Downstream Operations (KODO).180
 It is obvious that the KRG aims to secure the northern Iraq energy resources 
for themselves. The Kurdish Regional Government even claims that in the event of 
a disagreement between the federal authorities and the KRG, the KRG’s decisions 
take precedence over those of the federal government. This means that if the draft 
federal Iraqi oil law does not materialize, the KRG will continue its contract 
awarding process to foreign firms. This is a development that concerns not only the 
people of Iraq, but also regional countries, most importantly Turkey. The Turkish 
Foreign Ministry has so far opted the strategy of ‘wait and see’ regarding the draft 
oil law of Iraq. What it needs to do instead is enter into close dialogue with 
segments of the Iraqi society who oppose the KRG’s strong arm tactics, and 
organize a credible and diverse opposition to the Kurdish petroleum legislation. 
These are historic times that the region is going through, and passive diplomacy 
will result in long term losses, with disastrous consequences for the Turks. Taking 
into account the opposition of Iran, Syria, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
member Arab countries, the Sunni Arabs in Iraq, and segments of the Shiite Arab 
population in Iraq to the KRG’s moves, the Turks have a lot of options and room to 
maneuver in putting a halt to KRG intentions.  
 We have taken a look at the differences between the federal government and 
the KRG in their approach to handling the energy sources. If resolved in favor of 
the Kurds, the oil distribution laws of the Iraqi state has the potential to change the 
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 balance of power in the region in the long term. Now let us shift our attention to 
what foreign policy options Turkey has for the future, and the steps that it needs to 
take in order protect its national interests in the region. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Despite the series of mistakes in foreign policy initiatives in the region, 
Turkey still has a lot of weapons at its disposal. First of all, it has managed to 
preserve its credibility in the eyes of the regional states, by the Turkish 
Parliament’s refusal of the deployment of U.S. troops through Turkey into northern 
Iraq, on March 1st, 2003. Although this has often been referred to as the low point 
in U.S-Turkish relations, the risks involved for Turkey were far too great to accept. 
Colin Powell’s words during a National Security Council meeting before the 
March-2003 invasion are an indicator of the mood in Washington at the time:  
I think Turks can handle the over flights, I think they can handle the 
through-put, I think they can handle the air space. Its when you talk about 
moving an armored division or mechanized division overland through the 
length of Anatolia with a long huge train behind it, huge numbers of 
vehicles, going to invade another Muslim country. I will go for that, but that 
may be one too many bricks on the scale for the Turks. I don’t think we can 
get it and we’re risking losing it all by going for that. 181
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  When we look at the negotiations that went on before the refusal of the 
Turkish Parliament on the government motion for granting right of passage to U.S. 
troops, we can rely on the statements made by Deniz Bölükbaşı, a senior bureaucrat 
who was personally involved in the negotiating process with the Americans. This is 
what he had to say regarding what the Americans were asking for and offered in 
return at the time, 
The Americans from the beginning did not want Turkish troops to enter 
Iraq. If we did enter, they wanted relatively few numbers that would be 
under American command. Turkey would enter 20 km. into Iraq. This was 
accepted by both sides. Turkish forces would not engage the Iraqi forces. 
They would instead guard against a possible wave of refugees. If the 
Turkmen were under attack in Kirkuk during the invasion, Turkish troops 
could join the Americans for tactical operations in the city. The Americans 
insisted that the Turkish Armed Forces could only resort to arms in a 
situation of self defense. This was an unacceptable and hard to understand 
demand on their part, how could we be expected to only resort to arms in 
self defense against the terrorist organization, PKK? 182  
 
 Several points stand out from Mr.Bölükbaşı’s explanation of the negotiation 
process. First of all, even if the Turkish troops did enter 20 kilometers into northern 
Iraq, an area where most of the PKK camps are located, it would have been 
fruitless. This is because the KDP would have most likely warned the PKK 
militants before the operations began, and they would have left the camps long 
before the Turkish troops arrived. And under no circumstances would Turkish 
troops be allowed into Kirkuk, because the Americans would claim that the security 
situation in the city were under their control. Despite all of these obvious pitfalls, 
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 the AKP government presented the motion to the Parliament on the 1st of March 
2003. The voting was close, with 533 MP’s who cast their vote, 264 voted in favor, 
250 voted against and there were 19 abstentions.183 However the motion failed 
because it needed 267 votes to obtain majority, and it failed to do that. 
 Due to the decision of the Turkish Parliament, the Americans seemed to be 
caught by surprise. Steven A. Cook of the ‘Council on Foreign Relations’ think 
tank makes an accurate observation on this matter, he states: 
Before the vote, what we thought might happen was a fundamental 
misreading of what was going on in Turkey at the time. You had a 
population that is nationalist by nature. The people who we generally 
thought we could count on in Turkey, which is the Turkish military, thought 
that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a bad idea. The AKP in Turkey was a 
very young government. It was unclear whether it would be able to deliver 
enough votes. 184
 
 The government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) could not 
successfully manage the negotiation process with the Americans. Instead of giving 
the false sense of security to the U.S. administration about the motion presented to 
the Turkish Parliament, the AKP government could have been more cautious. This 
could have been done by asking for very specific and non-negotiable guarantees 
from the Americans prior to presenting the motion to the Parliament. Such requests 
could have been asking for unrestricted access of Turkish troops into northern Iraq 
without any limitations on the rules of engagement or the amount of distance they 
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 could travel into Iraq, Turkish troop presence in sensitive cities like Kirkuk for 
protection of the Turkmen, and total engagement of the PKK by the Turkish Armed 
Forces. Once these requests would have been delivered to the U.S., Washington 
would have most likely refused and cancelled its strategy of opening up a northern 
front. What was done instead by the AKP government was to try and bargain for an 
aid package with the United States, giving the impression that Turkish cooperation 
was for sale. The Turkish government also gave the impression that the motion 
would pass in the Parliament, which in return resulted in the American mobilization 
of naval ships and troops to the Mediterranean. All this, once the motion failed, 
angered the United States, which felt betrayed by an old and trusted ally. And a 
blow was dealt to the Turkish- American relations that is still felt today.  
 While attending a Sunday morning talk show in the United States on the 
second anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq, the former Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld had this to say on the actions of Turkey at that crucial time 
period of March 2003: 
Given the level of insurgency today, two years later, clearly, if we had been 
able to get the 4th Infantry Division in from the north through Turkey, more 
of the Iraqi Saddam Hussein Baathist regime would have been captured or 
killed. The insurgency today would have been less. 185
 
 Clearly there is now some bad blood between the Bush administration and 
Turkey. One thing that needs to be understood is that Turkish troop presence in Iraq 
is unwanted not only by the Kurds but also by the Shiites and Sunni Arabs. A 
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 Turkish military incursion in Iraq would have historical implications, and this 
would not be welcomed by Iraqis. Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini al-Sistani has even 
issued a fatwa, declaring the presence of Turkish troops in Iraq as unwanted. 
Ambassador Paul Bremer’s memoirs on his time in Iraq as the head of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority gives us a clear view of the thought process of the Shiites 
against possible Turkish involvement in Iraq: 
Sistani opposed foreign troops from Iraq’s neighbors joining the Coalition. 
Although the Pentagon and the State Department continued to push to get 
Turks into Iraq, the option was effectively dead on arrival because of 
Sistani’s position. Shia in the Governing Council would make a common 
cause with Kurds, who vehemently opposed the introduction of Turkish 
troops into Iraq through their territory. 186
 
Even the nationalist Shiite, Moqtada al-Sadr would have opposed a Turkish 
presence in Iraq. Turkish troops would have been targets of a united Iraqi 
resistance, and perhaps al-Qaeda terrorist attacks would have been focused 
specifically in Turkey, causing devastating losses for a sustained period of time.  
Before we proceed any longer, let us recap the realities existent on the 
ground in Iraq at the moment. The Turkish – American relations in regards to the 
developments in Iraq are very tense. This is tied in part to the refusal of the March 
1st, 2003 motion in the Turkish Parliament. Another factor when looked at from the 
Turkish perspective is the negative effects on the Turkish population of the arrests 
in a humiliating fashion of Turkish Special Forces in Sulaymaniyah by American 
troops on July 4th, 2003. This caused a big rise in anti-American sentiments among 
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 the Turkish population, and was widely interpreted as an act of revenge by the 
Americans for the refusal of the March 2003 motion. Another huge factor for the 
tense relations and the one that tops the list of Turkish concerns is the 
ineffectiveness of the United States in engaging the PKK. An effort was made to 
better coordinate the battle against the PKK by the appointment of General Joseph 
Ralston as the ‘Special Envoy Countering the PKK’. However, it did not deliver 
any concrete results. His Turkish counterpart, General Edip Başer, was replaced by 
the AKP government on 21st of May, 2007 after General Başer criticized the 
process as being ineffective.187 His replacement, Ambassador Rafet Akgünay was 
unable to improve the situation.  
The PKK terrorists that are being arrested by Turkish Security Forces are 
increasingly being caught with American issued weapons. According to a July 31st, 
2007 United States Government Accountability Office investigation, the American 
military could not account for 190,000 weapons issued to Iraqi Security Forces in 
2004-2005. Including 110,000 AK 47 Assault Rifles, 80,000 Pistols, 135,000 
pieces of body armor and 115,000 helmets.188 This not to say that all of these went 
to the PKK, but it is hard to prove that a substantial amount did not fall into the 
hands of the terrorist organization. After the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the Coalition 
troops were subject to attack by ‘Improvised Explosive Devices’ (IED’s), and 
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 remote controlled land mines, this trend is now seen by attacks on Turkish Security 
Forces by the PKK. It is a foregone conclusion that the PKK was able to obtain 
these explosives and technology from Iraqi sources. 
Another reality on the ground is the aggressive stance taken by KRG 
President Messud Barzani towards Turkey. The high point of his careless 
comments came when he stated, “If Turkey intervenes in the Kirkuk problem, we 
will have the right to intervene in Diyarbakır”189 during an interview on the United 
Arab Emirates television network, Al-Arabiyya. There is also the problem of 
Barzani’s ties to certain political groups within Turkey which are being used to 
create unrest within the country. The Democratic Society Party (DTP), the political 
arm of the terrorist organization PKK is known to have close ties to Barzani.  
In light of this behavior by Messud Barzani and the fact that PKK is 
roaming around freely in northern Iraq, the Chief of General Staff of the Turkish 
Armed Forces General Yaşar Büyükanıt has given the green light to conduct a 
military operation into northern Iraq. He has provided ample evidence of PKK 
activity in the region.  
On the other hand the draft ‘Oil Law’ has failed to bring all sides together in 
Iraq, no agreement has been reached on the issue and none is likely to be reached in 
the near future. Despite this, the Kurdish Regional Government has drawn up its 
own petroleum law and started handing out contracts to foreign companies.  
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   The above mentioned points underline the most important developments in 
the region and the challenges that face Turkish foreign policy in the near future. 
What the Turkish government needs to do is broaden its perspective of the region. 
While the Turkmen are very important for Turkey, they are not the only political 
actors that the Turks can establish relations with. 
 What Turkey needs to do at the moment is look at all the groups in Iraq 
which are in favor of keeping the country intact. These include the Sunni Arabs, 
and the nationalist Shiite led by Muqtada al-Sadr. The activities of these groups 
could be supported by the Turkish government as long as their aims serve Turkish 
national interests. Simultaneously the strengthening of Turkmen unity needs to be a 
priority. Bringing together all Turkmen groups under a roof larger than that of the 
Turkmen Iraqi Front, could be an option. Irregardless of the religious differences 
between the Sunni and Shiite Turkmen, through careful planning and coordination, 
such a goal could be achievable. 
 Turkey could also cooperate with Iran when it comes to battling the PKK 
and PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) an affiliate terrorist organization of 
the PKK which is active in Iran. In mid August of 2007, Iranian security forces 
conducted extensive shelling of regions in northern Iraq believed to be housing 
PJAK terrorists.190 Future operations in the area could be coordinated with Iranian 
Security Forces to more effectively corner PKK terrorists.  
 On the other hand, economic pressure on the Kurdish Regional Government 
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http://www.kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=14218; (accessed August 20th, 2007)   
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 should be exerted. One way to achieve this could be to close down the Habur 
Border Gate temporarily until a compromise could be reached between Turkey and 
the KRG. A second alternative border crossing through the Turkmen regions could 
be created which would make the Habur Border crossing unnecessary. Contracts 
awarded to Turkish firms on strategically important projects and infrastructure of 
the KRG could also be halted until the KRG has taken action on the PKK issue. 
The supplying of electricity to northern Iraq could be made conditional on the KRG 
authorities taking action the issue of PKK terrorism. 
  The process of the Kirkuk referendum is also a very tricky subject. As 
looked at in the section on Kirkuk, Turkish foreign policy needs to be geared 
towards opposing the proposed referendum until a healthy atmosphere on the 
ground exists for a fair and free referendum. This opposition could be achieved by 
demonstrating to the international community that the Kurds have changed the 
demographics of the region by force. 
 If the above proposed actions are taken simultaneously, the PKK will be 
dealt a heavy blow, the KRG will not be able to use strong arm tactics on the issue 
of Kirkuk, and oil fields, Turkish partners in Iraq will be more diverse, Turkmen, 
Sunni Arab, and nationalist Shiites will work to achieve the same goal: a united, 
democratic Iraq. Turkey’s relations with regional countries will improve, and a 
partnership based on mutual respect for each others national security interests will 
be established with Iran. Other Arab countries in the region will share the same 
view when it comes to the territorial integrity of Iraq, and putting an end to Kurdish 
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 moves for secession from Iraq.  
 Many analysts might look at the recommendations made on this paper and 
classify them as hard line tactics. Yes, this is precisely what these 
recommendations aim to achieve. A Turkey which has adopted soft approaches in 
the region in the decades before has found itself in the impasse this paper has 
outlined. There is too much at stake: An independent Kurdish state in control of 
close to 20% of the world’s second largest oil reserves is about to be established. 
Whether or not it declares formal independence is not the issue. It most likely will 
not. But then it does not need to, either. If the KRG gains control of Kirkuk though 
a referendum, and gets 17% plus added reimbursements for ‘past injustices’ of the 
national oil income of Iraq, through its highly autonomous status in a federal Iraq, 
it will have achieved an indirect independence anyway. American support for their 
cause will most likely continue. As previous sections of this paper has 
demonstrated, Iraq is one of the most politically complicated states in the world. 
And at the moment, the Kurdish region presents an oasis of calm for the U.S. 
administration. They will not want to disturb this trend. 
 This paper has demonstrated that a lack of authority in northern Iraq has 
always led to increased PKK activity in Turkey. Today Turkey faces the opposite 
problem. There is an authority in northern Iraq, but it is the kind of authority that 
has hostile intentions for Turkish interests. It supports terrorism, tries to stir up 
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, and is in the process of gaining control of energy 
resources that could make it a regional power. As analyzed, Turkish foreign policy 
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 needs to diversify its approach and find partners in the region, both within and 
outside Iraq, that share the same concerns Turkey does on the territorial integrity of 
Iraq.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
  
 
 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
BOOKS: 
 
Al-Hirmizi, Ershad. 2003. The Turkmen and Iraqi Homeland. 
Istanbul: Kerkük Fund. 
 
Al-Hirmizli, Ershad. 2005. The Turkmen Reality in Iraq. 
Istanbul: Kerkük Fund. 
 
Al-Hirmizli, Ershad. 2003. Türkmenler ve Irak (The Turkmen and Iraq). 
Istanbul: Kerkük Fund. 
 
Bremer, L. Paul. 2006. My Year in Iraq – The Struggle to Rebuild Future Hope.  
Malcolm McConnell, ed. New York: Simon & Schuster 
 
Cemal, Hasan. 2003. Kürtler (Kurds).  
Istanbul: Doğan Press 
 
Günay, Tuncer. 2007. Şemdin Sakık Anlatıyor – Kobralar Üzerimize Gelince  
Aklımızı Kaçırıyorduk (Şemdin Sakık Describes: When the Cobra’s Came at 
us, We Used to Lose Our Mind). Istanbul: Doğan Press. 
 
Hourani, Albert. 1991. A History of the Arab Peoples. 
New York: Warner Books. 
 
Özdağ, Ümit. 2007. Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonları 1984 – 2007 (PKK  
Operations of the Turkish Army 1984 – 2007). Istanbul: Pegasus. 
 
Özkan, Tuncay. 2005. Abdullah Öcalan – Neden Verildi? Nasıl Yakalandı? Ne  
Olacak? (Abdullah Öcalan: Why was he handed over? How was he caught? 
What will happen?).Istanbul: Alfa Press. 
 
Özkan, Tuncay. 2005. Milli Istihbarat Teşkilatı – MIT’in Gizli Tarihi (The Secret  
History of the National Intelligence Agency-MIT). Istanbul: Alfa Press. 
 
122 
  
Öznur, Hakkı. 2003. Cahşların Savaşı – Kuzey Irak Kürt Hareketi ve Musul-  
Kerkük Meselesi (War of the Cahş - Northern Iraq Kurdish Movement and 
Mosul, Kirkuk Problems). Ankara: Altınküre Press. 
 
Öztürk, Saygı. 2007. Madalyalı Mahkum (Convict With a Medal).  
 Istanbul: Doğan Press.  
 
Packer, George. 2005. The Assassins Gate: America in Iraq. 
New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux. 
 
Sluglett, Marion Farouk and Sluglett, Peter. 2001. Iraq Since 1958: From  
Revolution to Dictatorship. New York: Tauris & Co Ltd. 
 
Tripp, Charles. 2000. A History of Iraq. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Uğurlu, Nurer. 2006. Kürt Milliyetçiliği – Kürtler ve Şeyh Sait Isyanı (Kurdish  
Nationalism: Kurds and the Sheikh Sait Rebellion). Istanbul: Örgün Press. 
 
 
JOURNAL AND BOOK ARTICLES: 
 
Aylin Güney, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance  
From Cold War to War on Iraq”, Turkish Studies, Volume 6, No. 3, 
pgs.341-359. 
 
Fırat, Melek, Kürkçüoğlu, Ömer. 2001. “Türkiye’nin Kuzey Irak Operasyonları ve  
PKK Açısından Sonuçları (Turkey’s Northern Iraq Operations and Its 
Effects on PKK).” In Baskın Oran, ed., Türk Dış Politikası – Kurtuluş 
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt II (Turkish Foreign 
Policy : Facts, Documents and Interpretations from the War of 
Independence Until Today, 2nd Volume). Istanbul: Iletişim Press, pg.133. 
 
H. Tarık Oğuzlu, “Endangered Community: The Turkoman Identity in Iraq”, 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volume 24, No.2, October 2004, 
pgs.309 – 325. 
 
James E. Kapsis, “From Desert Storm to Metal Storm: How Iraq has Spoiled US -        
Turkish Relations”, Current History, Volume 104, No. 685, November 
2005. 
 
 
 
123 
  
Keskin, Funda. 2001. “Sıcak Takip (Hot Pursuit).” In Baskın Oran, ed., Türk Dış  
Politikası – Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 
II (Turkish Foreign Policy : Facts, Documents and Interpretations from the 
War of Independence Until Today, 2nd Volume). Istanbul: Iletişim Press, 
pg.134. 
 
Neophytos G. Loizides, “Greek - Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession  
Process”, Security Dialogue, Volume 33, Number 4, pgs.429-442. 
 
Thomas S. Mowle, “Iraq’s Militia Problem”, 
Survival, Volume 48, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pgs.41-58. 
 
Uzgel, Ilhan. 2001. “Abdullah Öcalan’ın Yakalanması (Apprehension of Abdullah  
Öcalan).” In Baskın Oran, ed., Türk Dış Politikası – Kurtuluş Savaşından 
Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt II  (Turkish Foreign Policy : 
Facts, Documents and Interpretations from the War of Independence Until 
Today, 2nd Volume), Istanbul: Iletişim Press, pg.296.  
 
 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS: 
 
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Law of Administration for the State of  
Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL). Baghdad. 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html; 
(accessed March 2nd,2007).  
 
The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq. February 10th, 2006. Certification  
of the Council of Representatives Final Result. Baghdad. 
http://www.ieciraq.org/final%20cand/IECI_Decision_Certified_Results_of_
CoR_Elections_En.pdf; 
(accessed December 8th, 2006).  
 
Petraeus, David. 10,11 September, 2007. “Report to Congress on the Situation in  
Iraq.” Report. United States Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.  
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf; 
(accessed September 14th, 2007).  
 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Building up of International Solidarity. 
Ankara. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Terrorism/Building
upofinternationalsolidarity.htm; 
(accessed August 6th, 2007). 
 
124 
  
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Financing of its Activities. Ankara. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MainIssues/Terrorism/Financin
gofitsactivities.htm; 
(accessed August 6th, 2007).  
 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. January 28th, 2005. Statement of the  
Spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Ankara. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/PressInformation/PressReleasesAndStatements
/pressReleases2005/January/NO3_28January2005.htm;  
(accessed January 6th, 2007).  
 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. February 13th, 2005. Statement of the  
Spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Ankara. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/PressInformation/PressReleasesAndStatements
/pressReleases2005/February/NO23_13February2005.htm; 
 (accessed January 6th, 2007).   
 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Türk Hükümetleri Kronolojisi – Chronology of  
Turkish Governments. Ankara. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/Kutuphane/TurkHukumetleriKronolojisi/ ; 
(accessed July 8th, 2007).  
 
United States Department of State. December 15th, 2005. Iraqi Voters Choose  
First Permanent Constitutional Government. Washington, D.C. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2005&m=December&x=20051215095713ndyblehs0.9486963&
t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html;
(accessed February 18th, 2007).  
 
United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.                               
2005. Country Reports on Terrorism 2005. Washington, D.C. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf;
(accessed August 12th, 2007).  
 
United States Department of State. August 14th, 2006. Turkey: 22nd Anniversary of            
PKK Violence. Washington, D.C.  
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/70550.htm; 
(accessed January 5th, 2007). 
 
The White House. January, 2007. Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq.  
Washington, D.C. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html; 
(accessed January 20th, 2007).  
125 
  
The White House. January 10th, 2007. President’s Address to the Nation.  
Washington, D.C. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html; 
(accessed January 14th, 2007).  
 
 
REPORTS: 
 
Baker Institute. December 6th, 2006.“Iraq Study Group Report.”   
http:www.bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/iraqstudygroup_findings.pdf; 
(accessed February 1st, 2007). 
 
Beehner, Lionel. June 30th, 2006. “The Challenge in Iraq’s Other Cities: Kirkuk.”  
Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/11036/; 
(accessed August 20th, 2007). 
 
Beehner, Lionel. April 23rd, 2007. “The Iraqi Kurdish Question.” 
Council on Foreign Relations. 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13136/iraqi_kurdish_question.html; 
(accessed August 3rd, 2007). 
 
The Brookings Institution. “Iraq Index – Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and  
Security in Post-Saddam.” 
http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index200550218.pdf; 
(accessed August 22nd, 2007).  
 
Cook, Steven A. May 29th, 2007. “Turkish-US Tensions ‘Great Underreported  
Story of Iraq War”, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12963/cook.html; 
(accessed July 6th, 2007). 
 
Çağaptay, Soner. Dec. 2006. “How Can Europe Address its PKK Problem.”  
Transatlantic Institute Briefing, Washington Institute, Washington D.C.  
www.washingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/45783105c171b.pdf;  
(accessed January 2nd, 2007). 
 
Çağaptay, Soner. March 27th, 2003. “Turkmens the Soft Underbelly of the War in  
Iraq.” The Washington Institute. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1613; 
(accessed February 12th, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
126 
 Erkmen, Serhat. June, 2007. “Türkiye’nin Kuzey Irak Perspektifi ve Hareket Alanı  
(Turkey’s Northern Iraq Perspective and Areas of Movement).” Avrasya 
Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, ASAM, Ankara. 
http://www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp393.pdf; (accessed August 2nd, 2007). 
 
Fried, Daniel. March 15th, 2007. “U.S. – Turkish Relations and the Challenges  
Ahead.” Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Subcommittee on Europe, Washington, DC. 
www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/81790.htm; 
(accessed August 12th, 2007). 
 
Gwertzman, Bernard. May, 2007. Interview with Cook, Steven A.  
“Cook: Turkish – US Tensions: ‘Great Underreported Story of Iraq War.” 
Council on Foreign Relations. 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12963cook.html; 
(accessed August 3rd, 2007). 
 
ICS. April 19th, 2007. “Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis.”  
International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No.64. 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4782&CFID=26477642&C
FTOKEN=56076937; 
(accessed July 5th, 2007). 
 
Salman, H. November 23rd, 2005. “Sunnis Complain of Random Arrests, Torture.” 
Iraqi Crisis Report, No.53. 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=icr&s=f&o=258183&apc_state=henh; 
(accessed January 8th, 2007). 
 
Stansfield, Gareth. May 2007. “Accepting Realities in Iraq.”  
Chatham House, U.K. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications 
/papers/view/-/id/501/ ; (accessed July 23rd, 2007). 
 
UNPO. August, 2005. “Iraqi Turkmen Underlines Undemocratic Aspects of the  
New Iraqi Constitution Draft.” Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization, Iraqi Turkmen Rights Research Foundation. 
http://www.unpo.org.org/article.php?id=2882; 
(accessed January 4th, 2007). 
 
USAK. 2006. “PKK Kronoloji 1978 – 2006 (PKK Chronology 1978 – 2006).”  
International Strategic Research Organization USAK. 
www.usakgundem.com/pdfs/USAK_PKK_Kronoloji.pdf;   
(accessed Sunday May 27, 2007).  
 
 
127 
  
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND INTERNET SOURCES: 
 
“ABD’ye inat Irak’a ikinci kapı (Despite the U.S. a Second Gate in Iraq)”, Hürriyet  
Newspaper, 10 October, 2000, 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-188193; (accessed 
February 3rd,2007). 
 
Alexander, Caroline. “Iraqi Constitution Approved by 79% of Voters – (Update  
4)”, Bloomberg, Iraq’s Independent Electoral Commission Official Results, 
October 25, 2005, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=amqz7dZlEx3
w&refer=top_world_news; (accessed January 7th , 2007). 
 
Babacan, Nuray, Coskuner, Şenol, “PKK Kerkük’te (PKK is in Kirkuk)”, Hürriyet  
Newspaper, February 6th, 2007, 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=5899838; (accessed July 5th, 
2007). 
 
“Barzani: Türkiye’nin Kerkük’te hakkı varsa bizim de Diyarbakır’da var (Barzani:  
If Turkey claims rights on Kirkuk, then we have the same right for 
Diyarbakır)”, Hürriyet Newspaper, 07 April, 2007, 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6289432; (accessed June 
8th, 2007).  
 
Başyurt, “Interesting Outcomes in Iraqi Election”, Zaman Newspaper, February 19,  
2005.http://www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=16
703; (accessed February 3rd , 2007). 
 
Besheer, “Tensions High Between Turkey, Iraqi Kurds”, Voice of America, April  
19, 2007. 
http://web.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010200&rnrz73&
anr=17373; (accessed July 2nd , 2007). 
 
“Bremer’s Task: Regain Momentum in Iraq”, The Christian Science Monitor, 
  May 14th, 2003,  http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0514/p02s02-woiq.html; 
(accessed August 18th,, 2007). 
 
“Büyükanıt’ın Konuşmasının Tam Metni (Chief of Turkish General Staff General  
Büyükanıt Speech)”, Hürriyet Newspaper, 12th April, 2007. 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6321761_p.asp; (accessed April 12th, 
2007).  
 
 
128 
 “Cabinet List”, CNN, January, 2004 
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/01/cabinet.list/index.html;  
(accessed July 25th, 2007). 
 
“CBC News In depth Iraq”, CBC, April 27, 2006,  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/afterelection_faq.html; (accessed  
July 24th, 2007). 
 
“Constitution of Iraq”, KRG.org,  
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=&lngnr=12&rnr=107&anr=12
329; (accessed February 28th, 2007).  
 
Cook, Jonathan, “Sacrificed to Zionism”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 2/8 August 2007, 
Issue No. 856,  http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/856/op56.htm; 
(accessed August 12th, 2007).  
 
“Deniz Bölükbaşı Anlatıyor”, HaberTürk , May 27, 2007,  
http://www.haberturk.com/haber.asp?id=24518&cat=110&dt=2007/05/27 , 
(accessed August 2nd, 2007).  
 
“Dışişleri’nden Kerkük uyarısı (Foreign Ministry’s Kirkuk Warning)”, ANKA, May  
2, 2007, http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6445723; (accessed 
July 5th, 2007). 
 
“Edip Başer’den ilginç öneri (Interesting Offer from Edip Başer)”, Hürriyet  
Newspaper, 13 June, 2003,   
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6703929; (accessed August 
4th, 2007). 
 
“Edip Başer’le ilgili görev değişikliği kararı (Decision for removal of Edip Başer)”,  
Hürriyet Newspaper, May 21, 2007,  
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6553933 , (accessed June 
3rd, 2007).   
 
“Elektrik Barzani’ye 9, halka 12.4 kuruş (Electricity to Barzani is 6.7 cents, to the  
people, 9.5 cents)”, ANKA News Agency, 16 July, 2007, 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6899843; (accessed August 
11th, 2007).  
 
Ergan, Uğur “Habur’a ikinci kapıya Genelkurmay’dan ret (Turkish General Staff  
Refuses Barzani’s offer of a Second Gate)”, Hürriyet Newspaper, 9 August, 
2007, http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=7056165; (accessed 
September 1st, 2007). 
 
129 
 “Guide to Iraqi Political Parties”, BBC, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4511450.stm; (accessed August 7th, 
2007). 
 
Hafidh, “Iraq Parliament May Take Months to OK Oil Law”, DowJones  
Newswires, July 16 – 2007, 
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a=id=47673; (accessed August  
3rd, 2007).  
 
“Information on the ‘Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan”, 
Official Website of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 
http://www.puk.org/web/htm/news/nws/730.pdf; (accessed July 5th, 2007). 
 
“Iranian Forces, Kurdish Guerillas Clash on Iraq-Iran Border”, KurdMedia, 
July 12th, 2007, http://www.kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=14218; 
(accessed August 20th, 2007). 
 
Iraq Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.org; (accessed September 6th, 2007).  
 
“Iraqi Cabinet Approves Draft Oil Law”, USA Today Newspaper, February, 2nd  
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-02-26-cabinet-
oil_x.htm; (accessed July 3rd, 2007). 
 
“Iraqi Cabinet Members”, The Iraq Foundation,  
http://www.iraqfoundation.org/iraqi_cabinet.htm; (accessed January 2nd,  
2007). 
 
“Iraqi Constitution of 1970”, 
http://www.vescc.com/constitution/iraq-constitution-eng.html; (accessed  
January 16th, 2007). 
 
“Iraq’s Federal Government’s “Draft Oil Law””, Iraq Enterprise, www.iraq-      
enterprise.com/oillaw/OLdraftE.pdf; (accessed July 11th, 2007). 
 
“Iraq Governing Council”, GlobalSecurity.org,  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/igc.htm; (accessed July 
12th, 2007). 
 
“Iraqi Oil Draft Law Collapses”, International Herald Tribune, September 14,  
2007, http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=50243; (accessed  
September 14th, 2007). 
 
 
 
130 
 “Iraq: Summary of Draft Oil Law”, March 2nd, 2007, Radio Free Europe, Radio  
Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/featuresartice/2007/03/9d033277-ae99; 
(accessed June 3rd, 2007). 
 
“Iraq Turkmen Culture Association”, 
http://kerkuk.dk/ENG/0005.htm; (accessed Sept. 2nd, 2007). 
 
“Iraq War Deaths Total Number”, The Washington Post, May 15th, 2007,  
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/1270857711.html?dids
=1270857711:1; (accessed May 15th, 2007). 
 
Islamic Dawa Party Official Website,  
http://www.islamicdawaparty.com/?module=home&fname=history.php&ac
tive=7; (accessed August 12th, 2007). 
 
Joffe, Lawrence, “Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al – Hakim – Obituary”,  
The Guardian Newspaper, U.K., August 30th, 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1032018,00.html; 
(accessed January 19th, 2007). 
 
“Kirkuk Referendum Needed Soon, says Iraqi Kurdish Leader”, Committee on  
Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, KRG.org, 08 May, 2007, 
http://web.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010200&rnrz73&
anrz17784; (accessed 12th, May, 2007). 
 
“KRG Signs Oil and Gas Contract With US Based Hunt Oil”, KRG.org.  
http://www.kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=14365; (accessed September 
2nd, 2007). 
 
Krauss, “Iraqi deaths spike five months into US troop surge”, Middle East Times,  
August 1st, 2007, 
http://www.metimes.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20070801-070035-
3436r, (accessed August 10th, 2007). 
 
“Kurdistan’s Petroleum Law Gets Frist Reading in Kurdistan’s Parliament”,  
KRG.org,  (9 July, 2007), 
http://web.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010100&lngnr=12&rnr=223
&anr=18943 , (accessed Aug. 4th, 2007). 
 
“Kürt bakan: Habur kapanırsa iki taraf da zarar görür (Kurdish Minister: If Habur is  
closed, both sides will incur losses)”, Hürriyet Newspaper, 13 June, 2007, 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6701389; (accessed August 
4th, 2007). 
 
131 
 Lyons, G., “Turkish Jets Blast Kurds in Iraq”, The Independent Newspaper,  
London, March 21st, 1995. 
www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-4705951.html; (accessed December 2nd, 
2006). 
 
Moore, T., “Killings Linked to Shiite Death Squads in Iraqi Police Force”, LA  
Times, 29 November, 2005.  
 
Official Investment Site of the Kurdistan Development Corporation,  
http://www.kurdistancorporation.com; (accessed January 4th, 2007). 
 
Official Website of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, 
http://www.kerkuk.net/; (accessed May 4th, 2007). 
 
Official Website of ‘Turkmen People’s Party’,  
http://www.angelfire.com/tn/halk/bildiri.html; (accessed May 5th, 2007). 
 
Özdağ, Ümit, “Kerkük, Telafer ve İç Savaş (Kirkuk, Telafer and Civil War)”, 
Yeniçağ Newspaper, September 14th, 2004. 
 
“Petroleum Act of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq – Final Draft”, KRG.org,  
www.krg.org/pdf/Kurdistan_Petroleum_Act_Final_Draft.pdf; (accessed 
August 27th, 2007). 
 
“Profile: Lakhdar Brahimi”, BBC News,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1593430.stm; (accessed June 9th, 
2007). 
 
Rupert, F., “Iraqi Guards Seen as Death Squads”, Newsday, 15 November, 2005. 
 
“Shiite Alliance Wins Plurality in Iraq”, CNN, February 14, 2005,  
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/13/iraq.main/index.html;  
(accessed July 2nd, 2007).  
 
Stewart, “Fight for Control: Iraq Oil Under Pressure”, The Guardian Newspaper,  
July 15th, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2126511,00.html; 
(accessed August 4th, 2007). 
 
“Suriye’ye Sabrımız Kalmadı (We have no more patience left for Syria)”, Hürriyet  
Newspaper, 17th September, 1998, 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-38649; (accessed July 
14th, 2007).  
 
 
132 
 “Tartışmalı tezkere reddedildi (Debated motion rejected)”, Hürriyet Newspaper,   
1st March, 2003, http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/03/01/255362.asp , 
(accessed February 5th, 2007). 
 
“Unification Agreement between the KDP and PUK”, KRG.org,  
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr=24&lngnr=12&anr=8891&smap;  
(accessed July 1st, 2007). 
 
“US Military deaths in Iraq at 3,738”, Associated Press, September 3, 2007,  
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070902/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_us_deaths_3; 
(accessed September 3rd, 2007).  
 
“US Surge Plan in Iraq ‘Working’ ”, BBC, 10 September, 2007,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6986461.stm; 
(accessed 10th September, 2007).  
 
“White House Warns Iran on Iraq”, CNN, April 24th, 2004, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/23/sprj.irq.war.main/; 
(accessed June 15th, 2007). 
 
W. Kagan, Frederick, “Timelines and Defeat”, National Review Online,  
August 28th, 2007, 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26706/pub_detail.asp; 
(accessed September 2nd, 2007). 
 
“World – Europe Kurdish Leader Goes to Trial”, BBC World, Sept. 3rd, 1998,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/163622.stm; (accessed January 23rd, 
2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 
  
APPENDIX A 
 
MAP OF SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY, REFERRED TO AS “BOTAN” BY 
THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION PKK 
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191 Microsoft Encarta World Atlas, (1996 Edition) 
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                                            APPENDIX B 
                TURKISH GOVERNMENTS FROM 1983 TO 1999 
 Government From Until
Özal Government 13 December, 1983 21 December, 1987 
Özal Government 21 December, 1987 9 November, 1989 
Akbulut 
Government 
9 November, 1989 23 June, 1991 
Yılmaz Government 23 June, 1991 20 November, 1991 
Demirel 
Government 
20 November, 1991 25 June, 1993 
Çiller Government 25 June, 1993 15 October, 1995 
Çiller Government 15 October, 1995 5 November, 1995 
Çiller Government 5 November, 1995 12 March, 1996 
Yılmaz Government 12 March, 1996 08 July, 1996 
Erbakan 
Government 
08 July, 1996 30 June, 1997 
Yılmaz Government 30 June, 1997 11 January, 1999 
Ecevit Government 11 January, 1999 28 May, 1999 192
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
192 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Türk Hükümetleri Kronolojisi (Chronology of  
Turkish Governments)”, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/Kutuphane/TurkHukumetleriKronolojisi/  
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 APPENDIX C 
 
Ministry Of Interior – Republic of Turkey – Effects of PKK terrorism in 
South Eastern Turkey from 15.08.1984 to 20.02.2000 
 
 
Number of Armed Attacks by the PKK……………………………………...6,751 
Number of Clashes with Security Forces…………………………………….8,581 
Bomb attacks and use of Land Mines by PKK………………………………3,519 
Road Blocks and Kidnappings by the PKK…………………….……………1,071 
Illegal Propaganda Distribution by the PKK………………….……………….676 
Illegal Gatherings and Demonstrations by the PKK……………………..….....852 
Total of Registered Incident Reports………………..……………………....21,866 
Security Personnel Killed by PKK……………………………..………….....5,546 
Security Personnel Wounded by the PKK……………………………..…....11,387 
Number of Terrorists Killed……………………………..…………………..18,958 
Number of Terrorists Captured Wounded…………………...……………….…706 
Number of Terrorists Who Surrendered………………………………………2,192 
Journalists Killed by PKK……………………………………………………..…21 
Number of Mayors Killed by PKK……………………………...…………….....23 
Number of Lower Level Gov’t Employees Killed by PKK………………….......60 
Number of Teachers Killed by PKK…………………….……………………...164 
Number of Imam’s Killed by 
PKK………………………………………………………………………………27 
193
                     
193 Günay, Şemdin Sakık Anlatıyor: Kobralar Üzerimize Gelince Aklımızı Kaçırıyorduk (Şemdin 
Sakık Describes: When the Cobra’s Came at us, We Used to Lose Our Mind), (Istanbul: Doğan 
Press, 2007), pg. 128 
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 APPENDIX D 
 
Number of Coalition soldiers killed since beginning of hostilities in Iraq 
 
Number of U.S. Soldiers killed:                       3,738 
Number of British Soldiers killed:                      168 
Number of Italian Soldiers killed:                         33 
Number of Polish Soldiers killed:                         21 
Number of Ukrainian Soldiers killed:                   18 
Number of Bulgarian Soldiers killed:                   13 
Number of Spanish Soldiers killed:                      11 
Number of Danish Soldiers killed:                         7 
Number of Salvadorian Soldiers killed:                 5 
Number of Slovakian Soldiers killed:                    4 
Number of Latvian Soldiers killed:                        3 
Number of Estonian, Thai, Australian  
Soldiers killed:                                                        2 (each) 
Number of Hungarian, Kazakh, Romanian,  
South Korean Soldiers killed:                                1 (each)  194
 
 
                     
 
194 Associated Press, “US Military deaths in Iraq at 3,738” – September 3, 2007, 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070902/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_us_deaths_3; (accessed September 3rd, 
2007)  
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APPENDIX E 
 
Map of Iraq – Governorates of Anbar, Nineva and Diyala 
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 APPENDIX F 
 
International Republican Institute Poll 
 
January 30 Election: December 26 – January 7, 2005 –  
Q 1: “How likely is it that you will vote in the election?”  
A  1:  Iraqi Population:  Very Likely:            64.5% 
                                   Somewhat Likely:       17.2% 
                               Somewhat Unlikely:         5.5% 
                                       Very Unlikely:         7.4% 
                                          Don’t Know:         4.5% 
A 2: Shia Arab Population:   Very Likely:     77.3% 
                                      Somewhat Likely:   14.10% 
A 3: Sunni Arab Population:  Very Likely.    19.1% 
                                       Somewhat Likely:    28.8% 
                                    Somewhat Unlikely:   17.8% 
                                           Very Unlikely:     28.8% 
A 4: Kurds:                           Very Likely:     70.9% 
                                        Somewhat Likely: 19.10% 196
 
                                                         
195 Microsoft Encarta World Atlas, (1996 Edition)  
196 The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index – Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in 
Post-Saddam”, pg.30, http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index200550218.pdf; (accessed 
August 22nd, 2007)  
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 APPENDIX G 
 
Referendum Results of October 15th, 2005 
 
 
Provinces Capital Yes No Votes 
Cast 
Ethnicity 
Al-Anbar Ramadi 3.04 96.96 259,91 Sunni Arab 
Erbil Erbil 99.13 0.64 830,570 Kurdish 
Babil Hilla 94.56 5.44 543,779 Shiite Arab 
Baghdad Baghdad 77.70 22.30 2,120,615 Mixed 
Basra Basra 96.02 3.98 691,024 Shiite Arab 
Dhi Qar Nasiriyah 97.15 2.85 462,710 Shiite Arab 
Diyala Baquba 51.27 48.73 476,980 Mixed 
Dohuk Dohuk 99.13 0.87 389,198 Kurdish 
Karbala Karbala 96.58 3.42 264,674 Shiite Arab 
Tamin Kirkuk 62.91 37.09 542,688 Turkmen/Kurd
Maysan Amara 97.79 2.21 254,067 Shiite Arab 
Muthanna Samawa 98.65 1.35 185,710 Shiite Arab 
Najaf Najaf 95.82 4.18 299,420 Shiite Arab 
Ninevah Mosul 44.92 55.08 718,758 Mixed 
Qadisyah Diwaniyah 96.74 3.26 297,176 Shiite Arab 
Salahaddin Tikrit 18.25 81.75 510,152 Sunni Arab 
Suleymaniyah Suleymaniyah 98.96 1.04 723,723 Kurdish 
Wasit Kut 95.70 4.30 280,128 Shiite Arab 
 TOTAL 78.59 21.41 9,852,291 197
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
197 Iraq’s Independent Electoral Commission Official Results, Alexander, “Iraqi Constitution 
Approved by 79% of Voters- (Update 4)”, October 25th, 2005 - 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=amqz7dZlEx3w&refer=top_world_new
s; (accessed January 9th, 2007)  
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 APPENDIX H 
 
December 15th, 2005 – Permanent Government Election Results 
 
Party/Coalition Seats in National Assembly 
United Iraqi Alliance 128 
Kurdistani Gathering 
was known as The Democratic 
Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan in 
Jan.30th, 2005 elections 
 
53 
Iraqi Accordance Front / 
Sunni Arab 
 
44 
National Iraqi List / 
Eyad Allawi 
 
25 
Islamic Union of Kurdistan 
was part of The Democratic 
Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan in 
Jan.30th, 2005 elections 
 
 
5 
Reconciliation and Liberation 
Bloc / 
Sunni Arab 
 
3 
Iraqi Turkmen Front 2 
141 
 Progressives / 
Shiite Arab 
2 
Mithal al-Aloosi List for Iraqi 
Nation 
1 
Al-Rafidian List / 
Christian 
1 
Al-Ezediah Movement for 
Progressing and Reform / 
Yazidi Minority 
 
1 
                                                                                                                                                                 
198
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
198 The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, “February 10th, 2006. Certification  
of the Council of Representatives Final Result”,  Baghdad. 
http://www.ieciraq.org/final%20cand/IECI_Decision_Certified_Results_of_CoR_Elections_En.pdf; 
(accessed December 8th, 2006) 
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 APPENDIX I 
 
 
Map of Kurdish Controlled Regions of Northern Iraq 
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199 Map of KRG, http://www.snappingturtle.net/jmc/images/kurdishregion.gif; (accessed February 
14th, 2007)   
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 APPENDIX J 
 
Map of Turkmen Settlement in Iraq 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Area of Turkmen settlement – In between the Black lines)200
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